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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two explore the impact of
government policies on human capital accumulation. Chapter one makes two novel
contributions related to the two workhorse models in the human capital literature:
Learning by Doing (LBD) and Ben-Porath (BP). First, I show that BP is much more
consistent with empirical life-cycle patterns related to individual earnings growth rates
relative to LBD. Second, I show that the same model features that generate different
life-cycle predictions between models also generate different policy implications. In
particular, increasing the top marginal labor tax rate, relative to the current US level,
generates much larger reductions in lifetime human capital accumulation in the BP
model versus the LBD model.
Chapter two examines reforms to the Social Security taxable earnings cap in the
context of a human capital model. Old age Social Security benefits in the US are
funded by a 10.6% payroll tax up to a cap of $118,500. There has been little work
examining the likely outcomes of such a policy change. I use a life-cycle BP human
capital model with heterogeneous individuals to investigate the aggregate and dis-
tributional steady state impacts of several policy changes the earnings cap. I find
that when I eliminate the cap: (1) aggregate output and consumption fall substan-
tially; (2) the role of endogenous human capital is first order; (3) total federal tax
revenues are lower or roughly unchanged; (4) about 1/3 of workers are made worse off.
The final chapter studies the existence and optimality of equilibria in the presence
of asymmetric information. I develop an equilibrium concept which corresponds to the
presence of mutual insurance organizations for a class of adverse selection economies
which includes the Spence (1973) signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) insurance
i
environments. The defining features of a mutual insurance organization are that pol-
icy holders are also the owners of the organization, and that the organization can
write policies for which the terms depend on the experience of the mutual members.
In general the equilibrium exists and is weakly Pareto optimal. Further, all equilibria
have the same individual type utility vector.
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Chapter 1
LEARNING BY DOING AND BEN-PORATH:
DIFFERENT LIFE-CYCLE PREDICTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1.1 Introduction
Many government policies affect incentives to accumulate human capital for working-
age adults. A growing literature studies the impact of these policies by running policy
experiments within structural life-cycle models of human capital accumulation. The
literature is split between two workhorse human capital models: Learning by Doing
(LBD) and Ben-Porath (BP). In LBD workers learn automatically when they spend
time producing; in BP learning and producing are separate, mutually exclusive ac-
tivities.
This paper contains two novel contributions related to these models. First, I show
that LBD and BP generate different life-cycle predictions. While both models are
consistent with the life-cycle mean and variance of earnings, wages, and hours levels
in the US, the BP model is much more consistent with life-cycle patterns related to
individual earnings growth rates.
Second, I show that the same model features that generate different life-cycle
predictions between the two models also generate different policy implications. The
policy change I focus on in this paper is an increase in marginal labor tax rates for top
earners. Increasing the top marginal tax rate reduces human capital accumulation
by top earners to a greater extent in the BP model than in the LBD model. The end
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result is that an increase in top marginal labor tax rates generates less revenue in the
BP model relative to the LBD model.
My analysis is based on a life-cycle human capital model where workers are born as
young adults endowed with an initial human capital stock and a learning ability, which
determines their proficiency at accumulating future human capital. Heterogeneity in
these initial endowments is the only way individuals differ from one another. Workers
are also endowed with a unit of time in each period. Time can be split between three
activities: production, during which the worker uses his human capital to produce
goods and services; investment, during which no goods or services are produced; and
leisure. In the BP version of the model workers learn by spending time investing in
their human capital. In the LBD version workers learn by spending time in produc-
tion, i.e. learning and earning occur simultaneously.
I first calibrate each model to the well-documented life-cycle profiles of mean earn-
ings, mean hours worked, and the variance of earnings for employed men aged 23-60
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The key features of these profiles
are that the mean earnings profile is hump-shaped, the hours profile is roughly flat,
and the variance of earnings profile is positively sloped.
I find that both models can quantitatively reproduce these profiles, but that they
do so in different ways. In the BP model workers choose to invest less as they age
(since the return to learning is lower for workers closer to retirement) and produce
more as they age (since the return to producing, which is proportional to human
capital, tends to be higher for older workers). Declining life-cycle investment endoge-
nously generates a hump-shaped earnings profile because workers accumulate human
2
capital more slowly as they age. The BP model also generates a roughly flat mean
hours profile because rising production time and falling investment time partially off-
set, resulting in small life-cycle changes to total hours worked.
Alternatively, workers in the LBD model cannot separately adjust time spent
learning and earning. In order to simultaneously generate a hump-shaped earnings
profile and a flat hours worked profile, then, the LBD model requires a combination
of decreasing returns in the human capital function, as well as large life-cycle declines
in learning ability or life-cycle increases in the rate of human capital depreciation.
In other words, both models predict that human capital (and earnings) grows
more slowly for older workers, but for different reasons. With LBD, accumulating hu-
man capital simply becomes harder with age. With BP, on the other hand, workers
choose to spend less time learning as they age.
These different predictions—that time spent learning falls to zero over the life-
cycle in the BP model, but is roughly constant over the life-cycle in the LBD model—
leads to different predictions for the distribution of earnings growth. BP predicts (1)
early in the life-cycle, when workers are investing, the earnings of high ability workers
grow faster than the earnings of low ability workers, and (2) later in the life-cycle,
when workers have stopped investing, the earnings of all workers grow at similar rates.
By contrast, because workers learn automatically in the LBD model, LBD predicts
that the earnings of high ability workers grow relatively faster than the earnings of low
ability workers throughout the life-cycle. Therefore, BP predicts that the variance
in earnings growth rates should fall over the life-cycle, while LBD predicts that this
variance should remain roughly constant over the life-cycle. In the data the variance
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of 5-year earnings growth rates falls by 30-50% from age 30-55; this decline is robust
to controlling for a host of factors including education, occupation, and temporary
earnings shocks. The BP model accounts for 90% of the observed life-cycle decline
in the variance of earnings growth, while the LBD model accounts for less than a third.
The different life-cycle predictions of these models also point to different policy
implications. In both models, the return to learning falls to zero over the life-cycle of
a worker. Workers in the BP model respond by dramatically reducing their human
capital investment as they age. Workers in the LBD model hold the amount of time
they spend learning roughly constant as they age. This suggests that a policy that
lowers the return to learning will generate a larger response by workers in the BP
model.
To illustrate this quantitatively, I analyze the steady state impact of increasing
the marginal labor tax rate for the top 1% of workers in each model. I find that
for a given tax increase, life-cycle time spent learning among workers affected by the
tax increase falls much more in the BP model than in the LBD model, which causes
life-cycle human capital to decline much more under the BP model. In particular,
when I increase the marginal tax rate on the top 1% of earners to 73%, which is
roughly the rate several previous papers have argued will maximize revenue from top
earners, I find that time spent accumulating human capital among affected workers
falls by 44% in the BP model versus 16% in the LBD model. This causes the earnings
of these workers to fall more in the BP model, and the end result is that tax revenues
from these workers falls by 36% in the BP model versus only 7% in the LBD model.
4
Background Many papers have examined the life-cycle predictions of either
LBD or BP in isolation. 1 Only a pair of papers study the life-cycle predictions of
LBD and BP side by side. Wallenius (2011) examines the predictions of a LBD and
BP model for mean hours and wages over the life-cycle, paying special attention to
the role of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor. Fan et al. (2015) ask
whether life-cycle human capital models are consistent with the behavior of wages
and labor force participation in a model with endogenous retirement. Neither find
compelling differences in the life-cycle predictions of LBD and BP. This paper is the
first to show that LBD and BP generate different life-cycle predictions for the disper-
sion in earnings growth rates.
Two papers have pointed out specific policies whose implications differ across LBD
and BP. Heckman et al. (2002) demonstrate that wage subsidies discourage skill for-
mation if a BP technology is assumed, but increase skill formation in a LBD setting.
Peterman (2012) demonstrates that the optimal tax rate on capital is 35% higher for
a BP model than for a LBD model. A related project by Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu
(2009) demonstrates that the predicted volatility of hours worked over the business
cycle differs across LBD and BP. I contribute to this literature by demonstrating an
additional policy where the impact differs strongly across LBD and BP, and connect-
ing the different policy implications of these models to different life-cycle predictions.
Finally, the tax policy analysis I conduct is relevant to a large literature on the
impact of raising marginal tax rates on high earners. 2 It is most closely related to
1Important examples include Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) for the LBD model and
Ben-Porath (1967), Heckman (1976), and Huggett et al. (2011) for the BP model.
2See for example Diamond and Saez (2011); Kindermann and Krueger (2014); Bru¨ggemann and
Yoo (2015); and Guner et al. (2015).
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recent work by Guvenen et al. (2014) and Badel and Huggett (2014), which demon-
strate that disproportionately raising marginal tax rates on high earners discourages
human capital accumulation. Guvenen and coauthors use this idea to argue that dif-
ferences in the progressivity of income taxes partially explain why (before-tax) wage
inequality is larger in the US than in Europe. Badel and Huggett apply this insight
to show that the revenue-maximizing marginal tax rate on top earners in the US is
much lower in a model with endogenous human capital than in a model with exoge-
nous wages. Both papers assume a BP human capital model. My policy experiments
suggest that their assumption is quantitatively important: earnings and time spent
learning respond much more to a change in tax progressivity in a BP model relative
to a LBD model. Additionally, my finding that the life-cycle predictions of the BP
model are consistent with a larger number of empirical moments than the LBD model
provides support for their choice of a human capital model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the LBD
and BP versions of the life-cycle model. Section 1.3 documents life-cycle facts for US
workers which I use to discipline the human capital models. Section 1.4 calibrates
parameters for the LBD and BP models to match facts from Section 1.3. Section
1.5 then compares the LBD and BP model predictions for the variance of earnings
growth rates over the life-cycle, which is untargeted during calibration. In Section
1.6 I analyze the impact of increasing the top marginal labor tax rate within each
model, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Life-cycle Human Capital Models
This section lays out the human capital accumulation model. I first discuss the
economic environment and the lifetime utility maximization problem of an individual
6
in Section 1.2.1. Section 1.2.2 details the BP and LBD versions of the human capital
production function. I then describe a worker’s time allocation problem in each set-
ting.
1.2.1 The Environment and the Worker’s Utility Maximization Problem
Time is discrete. Every period a unit mass of workers are born. All workers live for
J¯ periods. At birth each worker is endowed with initial human capital h1, and ability
a which determines their proficiency in creating new human capital. The distribution
of endowments (h1, a) is given by Λ(h1, a); this is the only source of heterogeneity in
the model.
Individuals are also endowed with a unit of time in each period. Time can be
split between three activities: production, n, investing, s, and leisure, 1− n− s. The
theoretical distinction between investing and production is that the individual is only
paid a wage for time spent in production; time spent investing is useful only to the
extent that it contributes to future human capital.
There is a single consumption good, c, whose price is normalized to one in each
period. Individuals have time-separable preferences over consumption and leisure rep-
resented by a potentially age-specific utility function uj. The individual’s problem is
to maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility subject to constraints on spending
and human capital:
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V (h¯1, a) = max
{nj ,sj ,hj+1,cj}J¯j=1
J¯∑
j=1
βj−1uj(cj , 1− nj − sj) (1.1)
s.t.
J¯∑
j=1
R1−jcj ≤
J∑
j=1
R1−jωhjnj ; (1.2)
hj+1 = (1− δ)hj +H(hj, nj, sj; a) ; (1.3)
nj, sj ≥ 0; nj + sj ≤ 1; nj = sj = 0 ∀j > J. (1.4)
β is the individual’s discount factor, and R is the gross interest rate in the econ-
omy. Constraint (1.2) states that the present value of lifetime consumption spending
cannot exceed the present value of lifetime labor earnings. Labor earnings in period j
are given by ωhjnj, where ω is the wage rate for a unit of human capital; hj is the indi-
vidual’s human capital in period j; and nj is the fraction of the time endowment spent
producing in period j. J ≤ J¯ is an exogenous retirement date, i.e. individuals must
set leisure equal to one beyond this date. From period J + 1 to J¯ , the individual sim-
ply consumes the portion of his lifetime income which has not already been consumed.
The constraints in (1.3) describe the human capital accumulation process. Human
capital in period j+ 1 is the sum of undepreciated human capital from the beginning
of period j and human capital produced in period j. δ is the depreciation rate of
existing human capital, and H is the human capital production function. The amount
of newly produced human capital is a function of the individual’s production and
investing choices in period j, as well as his existing human capital and his learning
ability.
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1.2.2 The Human Capital Production Functions
There are two versions of the human capital production function H. The LBD
version is given by:
H = ahφnθ . (1.5)
a is the individual’s learning ability: individuals with higher ability produce more
human capital for a given vector (h, n, s) than individuals with lower ability. φ and
θ determine the curvature of new human capital with respect to current human cap-
ital and production time, respectively. This represents a pure LBD human capital
accumulation process because the only input to human capital formation is time in
production. 3
The BP version of the human capital production function is given by:
H = ahφsθ . (1.6)
The function closely resembles the LBD case, except that now investment, s is the
sole time input for human capital formation. In the special case φ = θ the function
in (1.6) corresponds to the original Ben-Porath (1967) specification. 4 5
Despite the apparent similarity of the BP and LBD human capital functions, the
time allocation problem of a worker looks very different across these two cases. In the
LBD case investment is useless, so workers set sj = 0 ∀j. Workers then make their
time allocation decision in each period by equalizing the marginal benefit of leisure
3For examples of LBD functions previously considered in the literature see Shaw (1989); Chang
et al. (2002); Imai and Keane (2004); or Gemici and Wiswall (2014).
4The human capital function in Ben-Porath (1967) also includes market goods, e.g. books or
tutors, as inputs to human capital formation. The function in (1.6) implicitly assumes that the
weight on human capital inputs produced in the market is zero.
5Papers using this functional form include Heckman et al. (1998); and Huggett et al. (2011).
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and production:(
−∂uj
∂nj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Leisure)
=
(
λωhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Earning)
+ λ
(
∂hj+1
∂nj
)[J−j∑
k=1
R−kωnj+k
(
∂hj+k
∂hj+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Learning)
. (1.7)
The left hand side of (1.7) is the marginal value of leisure. The right hand side is
the marginal value of production, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget
constraint. The marginal value of production in the LBD model is made up of two
components. The first component is the marginal value of the worker’s current effec-
tive wage, ωhj. The right-most component in (1.7) is the marginal value of learning
in period j, which is the marginal increase in discounted earnings throughout the
remainder of the worker’s life due to a marginal increase in production in period j.
This component is absent in standard life-cycle models with exogenous wages.
In the BP model, solving a worker’s time allocation decision requires two first
order conditions:(
−∂uj
∂nj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Leisure)
=
(
λωhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Earning)
= λ
(
∂hj+1
∂sj
)[J−j∑
k=1
R−kωnj+k
(
∂hj+k
∂hj+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Learning)
. (1.8)
The first equality sets the marginal value of leisure equal to the marginal value of pro-
duction, which in the BP model is simply the marginal value of the worker’s current
wage. The second equality sets the marginal value of production equal to the marginal
value of investment. This additional equality arises because workers in a BP world
face a tradeoff between earnings today and earning potential tomorrow, in contrast
to workers in a LBD world who earn and learn through the same activity, production.
Workers who face such a tradeoff will behave differently from workers who do not.
When the returns to different activities change, either due to ageing or to a policy
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change, workers in a BP world will separately adjust production and investment to
bring their marginal benefits back into balance. Workers in a LBD world, on the
other hand, cannot separately adjust the time they spend earning and learning. The
remainder of this section discusses how this leads to different life-cycle predictions
and policy implications across the BP and LBD models.
1.2.3 Policy Implications of the BP and LBD Models
A simple example of a policy whose impact differs across the BP and LBD mod-
els is a temporary wage subsidy (for a more detailed analysis, see Heckman et al.
(2002)). Ignoring government budget requirements and general equilibrium effects,
suppose that the government unexpectedly subsidizes worker wages in the period j
at some rate ∆ > 0. If the subsidy has only a small impact on a worker’s lifetime in-
come, then the only change to the worker’s problem would be that the MV (Earning)
terms in equations (1.7) and (1.8) would change from λωhj to λω(1 + ∆)hj.
The wage subsidy raises the return to earning in period j, and in both models
workers reduce leisure in period j to restore the first order condition between leisure
and production. However, in the BP model investment in period j also declines in
order to restore the second equality in (1.8). Therefore, the wage subsidy decreases
human capital creation in the BP model, and increases human capital creation in
the LBD model. The intuition is that the subsidy decreased the marginal value of
learning relative to the marginal value of earning, which caused time spent earning
and learning move in opposite directions from each other in the BP model, but move
in the same direction in the LBD model (since learning and earning both occur via
production in this model).
11
In Section 1.6 I analyze another policy which changes the marginal value of learn-
ing relative to earning for top earners: increasing the marginal labor tax rates imposed
on top earners. I verify that this policy change generates different implications be-
tween the BP and LBD models, and that the differences are quantitatively important.
The returns to learning and earning don’t just vary across policy regimes—they
also vary over the life-cycle of a worker. Combined with the above finding that work-
ers in BP and LBD models respond differently to a change in the returns to learning
and earning, this suggests two points. First, BP and LBD will generate different
life-cycle predictions. Second, empirical life-cycle patterns will be informative about
how workers respond to changes in the relative returns to learning and earning, and
should therefore be informative about how workers will respond to policies which
impact these relative returns.
1.2.4 Life-cycle Predictions in the BP and LBD Models
The returns to earning and learning change over the life-cycle. The marginal value
of earning activities grows as the worker’s human capital grows. At the same time, all
else equal the marginal value of learning tends to fall as workers age since there are
fewer remaining periods before retirement in which new human capital can be used.
Therefore, to continue to satisfy equation (1.8), workers in the BP model reduce in-
vestment and increase time in production over the life-cycle. This means that in the
BP model the majority of human capital creation occurs early in the life-cycle; later
in the life-cycle workers simply cash in on their prior investments by spending time
in production. As noted in Ben-Porath (1967), an implication of this is that the BP
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model endogenously predicts that the growth of hourly wages and earnings tend to
slow over the life-cycle.
In the LBD model the marginal values of wages and learning evolve over the life-
cycle just as they do in the BP model. However, since production is responsible for
both earning and learning, workers only respond to changes to the sum of the value
of their wage and of learning. Since the value of the former tends to rise over the
life-cycle and the value of the latter tends to fall, it is not obvious what the life-cycle
path of production and wages will be in the LBD model.
The central objective of this paper is to investigate the extent to which each of
these models is consistent with empirical patterns of annual earnings, hourly wages,
and hours worked over the life-cycle. Section 1.3 documents these patterns for US
males in the PSID. In Sections 1.4-1.5 I demonstrate that the BP model is quantita-
tively consistent with these empirical patterns. I also demonstrate that, even when I
allow model parameters to vary with age, the LBD model is quantitatively consistent
with some moments but is inconsistent with others.
1.3 Life-cycle Facts for US Workers
This section establishes the main life-cycle facts for US workers. Section 1.3.1
documents life-cycle profiles for the mean and variance of annual earnings, hourly
wages, and hours worked, which I use to set model parameters for both the LBD
and BP versions of the model. Section 1.3.2 documents life-cycle patterns related to
the growth of earnings and hourly wages. These moments are not targeted during
calibration.
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I use data on earnings and hours from the 1968-2009 family-level files of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I restrict my sample to observations of male heads
of households between 23-60 years of age who report working at least 500 hours in
a given year and whose labor earnings were between $5,000 and $1 million in 2009
dollars. 6 These qualifications result in a sample of 11, 145 individuals and 80, 427
year-individual observations.
I exclude males over 60 for two reasons. First, the PSID contains few observations
of working men over 60. Second, decisions about wages and hours at this stage in life
may be exceptionally influenced by factors which are not present in this model.
I restrict ages on the low end in an attempt to focus on “working age” human
capital accumulation, as opposed to human capital accumulated during primarily
“school age” years. Two comments are necessary here. First, this restriction does not
imply that I ignore early-life human capital accumulation. Rather, I simply capture
the result of this early accumulation in a reduced form manner, through the initial
distribution of human capital and ability endowments. In fact, since these initial
endowments are the only source of heterogeneity in the model, early human capital
accumulation plays a crucial role in my analysis. Second, we know that young indi-
viduals work very little before their formal schooling is complete, and that individuals
who attend school longer earn higher hourly wages in their first few years of employ-
ment. A LBD model of early human capital accumulation would struggle to generate
6The sources of labor income used were “wages and salary”, “commission”, “overtime”, “profes-
sional practice income”, “tips”, “additional income”, and “all other labor income”. The minimum
hours and earnings thresholds are designed to exclude individuals who were full time students or
who experienced a long term unemployment spell. I throw out extremely high earners because these
few outliers occasionally alter the measured moments.
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these basic facts, while a simple BP process would do so easily. In contrast to this
trivial analysis, we know relatively little about which human capital theories are con-
sistent with hours and earnings facts after formal education has been completed.
I now discuss how the age profiles plotted in this section are obtained. The human
capital model laid out in Section 1.2 is not able to replicate every aspect of time
variation contained in the data, so I use a statistical model to extract the sources of
variation the model is designed to address. Following the approach of Huggett et al.
(2011), I first group the data into 5-year centered age bins. I then assume that the
statistics of interest are governed by the following fixed effects model:
stata,t,c = xa + xt + xc + a,t,c (1.9)
where a, t, c denote age, year, and birth cohort, respectively; where xa, xt, xc are age,
year, and cohort fixed effects, respectively; and where a,t,c is an error term. Since
c ≡ t − a, there is a well-known multicollinearity problem involved with estimating
this model. In light of this I assume that xc = 0 ∀c (a “year-effects” view).
1.3.1 Life-cycle Profiles Targeted During Calibration of LBD and BP Models
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict the data moments used to calibrate the BP and LBD
versions of the human capital model. Figure 1.1 plots the age effects for mean (a)
annual earnings, (b) hourly wages, and (c) hours worked. Annual earnings double
between 23 and 48 years of age, then decline 10% by age 60. Hourly wages double
by age 50 and remain near this peak through age 60. By contrast, mean hours are
relatively flat: they grow about 10% from age 23 to age 35, then gradually fall back
to their original level by age 60. In absolute terms mean annual hours start at 2,011
for 23 year olds and peak at 2,200 hours.
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Figure 1.1: Means for Earnings, Hourly Wages, and Hours Worked.
Note: Displays the age effects for mean earnings, hourly wages, and hours worked in
the data after controlling for year effects. The curves are normalized to percentages
of the maximum life-cycle value.
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The age effects for the log variance of annual earnings are displayed in Figure 1.2.
The variance in earnings among 23 year olds is approximately 45% of mean earnings,
and increases to 65% of mean earnings by age 60. An important feature of this profile
is that it is positively sloped at almost every age, implying earnings spread out over
the life-cycle.
Another important feature is that both the initial level of the earnings variance
profile, as well as the growth in the profile over the life-cycle, are primarily attributable
to the variance of hourly wages. Figure B1 reveals that the initial level of the variance
in hours worked is roughly a quarter of the initial level of the variance in hourly wages.
Further, the variance in hours worked is roughly constant over the life-cycle, while
the variance in hourly wages grows at a rate similar to that of the variance of earnings.
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Figure 1.2: Life-cycle Variance of log Earnings in the Data.
Note: Displays the age effects for the variance of log earnings in the data after
controlling for year effects.
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1.3.2 Untargeted Life-cycle Profiles
Figure 1.3 documents the variance in (a) wage and (b) earnings growth rates over
the life-cycle. The computation of this variable merits explanation. In the calibrated
human capital models a period will correspond to approximately 5 years, so I examine
growth rates over 5 years in the data. To compute the wage growth statistic for age a
and year t, I first group all individuals who are a years old in year t and who reported
valid hourly wages at both year t−5 and year t. I compute the log difference of wages
between years t and t−5 for each of these individuals, then find the variance in these
log differences across all individuals in the group (a, t). The statistic for earnings
growth is computed analagously. Age effects for these statistics are then estimated
using equation (2.18).
Figure 1.3 has two takeaways. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
earnings growth of young US workers: the variance in earnings growth among 29
17
Figure 1.3: Variance of Wage and Earnings Growth in the Data.
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of (a) wage and (b)
earnings growth in the data after controlling for year effects. See the text for details
of how this variable is computed.
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year olds is .22, which implies that the standard deviation of earnings growth among
these workers is 47 log points. Most of the heterogeneity in earnings growth is due
to heterogeneity in hourly wage growth: the variance in wage growth among 29 year
olds is .20, implying a standard deviation of 45 log points.
Second, Figure 3 reveals that the variance of 5-year wage and earnings growth
rates fall by 25-30% over the lifecycle, with roughly half of this decline occurring
after age 35. 7 8 In Section 1.5 I show that the BP and LBD models laid out in
Section 1.2 generate substantially different predictions for this life-cycle profile. The
basic intuition is that in the BP model workers invest less as they age, which reduces
the variance of earnings growth among workers with different learning abilities. In
the LBD model, by contrast, workers learn via time in production, which is fairly
7To remove the effect of outliers, I throw out any observations with growth rates less that 1/3,
and greater than 3. I follow the same procedure for the model in Section 6 when I compare the
model predictions to the data. The findings in that section are robust to changes in these cutoffs.
8Confidence intervals are bootstrapped, resampling 1,000 times.
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constant over the life-cycle (see Figure 1.1(c)). Therefore, the earnings of high and
low ability workers continue to grow at different rates throughout the life-cycle, and
the variance of earnings growth is relatively flat over the life-cycle.
Figures C1-C5 demonstrate that the life-cycle decline in the variance of wage and
earnings growth is robust to several alternative sample restrictions and controls, in-
cluding: restricting attention to full time workers; recomputing these profiles within
different education groups or occupation groups; grouping individuals by years of po-
tential experience rather than by age; restricting attention to workers who experience
nonnegative wage or earnings growth; and smoothing the wages and earnings of indi-
viduals with a Moving Average process to minimize the impact of purely temporary
earnings shocks. The details of these robustness checks are in Appendix C.
Summary of Key Features The key data features in Sections 1.3.1-1.3.2 are:
1. Mean hours worked are relatively flat over the life-cycle, changing by less than
10% from their initial level.
2. Mean annual earnings and hourly wages are concave, doubling from age 23-50,
then declining slightly until age 60.
3. The variance of log earnings increases by about 20 log points over the life-cycle.
4. The variance of 5-year wage and earnings growth rates falls by 25-50% over the
life-cycle, with half of this decline occurring after age 35.
The next sections investigate the extent to which the human capital models laid out
in Section 1.2 are consistent with these features.
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1.4 Setting Model Parameters
This section details how I choose parameter values for the BP and LBD models.
The main idea is to set parameter values for the BP and LBD models so that each is
consistent with the “standard” life-cycle moments summarized by points 1-3 in the
previous section, while leaving point 4 untargeted.
First, Section 1.4.1 discusses parameters whose values are exogenously determined
and identical for both models. Next, in Section 1.4.2 I jointly target the remaining
parameters in the baseline BP and LBD models to the life-cycle profiles for the mean
and variance of annual earnings, as well as the mean of hourly wages and hours
worked. I find that the baseline BP model is more consistent with the empirical pro-
files than the baseline LBD model. Finally, in Section 1.4.3 I consider extensions to
both the BP and LBD model in which I allow the value of model parameters to vary
with the age of a worker.
When comparing hours worked and hourly wages in the model and the data, I
assume reported hours worked in the data correspond to the sum of time in production
and time spent investing. This is equivalent to assuming that all human capital
investment takes place on the job after age 23. This assumption is standard in the
BP literature (see for example Guvenen et al. (2014) or Badel and Huggett (2014)).
My findings remain largely unchanged when I recalibrate the model assuming that
up to a third of investment is not included in hours worked.
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1.4.1 Parameters Set Exogenously
Solving the human capital models for a large number of individuals requires con-
siderable computational time, so I limit the number of working periods in the model
to J = 7. In the data I observe individuals over a 38-year working life, from ages
23-60, so each model period represents 38/J ≈ 5 years. 9 I set J¯ = 10, so that
individuals work for seven periods then live off their accumulated assets in retirement
for three. Since a period corresponds to roughly 5 years this implies that retirement
roughly corresponds to ages 61-75. The period real interest rate is set to R = 1.24
which implies an annual interest rate of 4%, and the individual discount factor is
β = 1/R.
Table 1.1: Parameters Set Exogenously.
Parameter Description Value
β Time discount factor .81
R Period (gross) interest rate 1.24
J¯ Periods in life-cycle 10
J Periods in working life-cycle 7
γ Curvature of utility of leisure 2
θ Curvature of H with respect to time input 0.7
I set θ, the curvature of the human capital function with respect to the time input,
equal to .7, near the middle of the values used in the BP literature. Period utility
9I translate the annual statistics presented in Section 1.3 by partitioning the 38 years of data into
J periods, then averaging the yearly statistics within each period bin. I partition ages into periods
according to the following schedule: Period 1, 23-28; Period 2, 29-33; Period 3, 34-39; Period 4,
40-44; Period 5, 45-50; Period 6, 51-55; Period 7, 56-60.
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over consumption and leisure takes the form
uj(c, 1− n− s) = log(c) + ψj (1− n− s)
1−γ
1− γ . (1.10)
I set γ = 2 to imply a mean Frisch elasticity 10 for non-leisure time of .6. The
parameter values set in this section are summarized in Table 1.1.
1.4.2 Parameters Targeted to Data: No Age-Variation in Parameters
The remaining model parameters are set jointly to match the following empirical
moments, presented in Section 1.3.1:
(1-2) Period 1 and peak values of mean annual earnings,
(3-5) Period 1, period 2, and peak values of the variance of annual earnings,
(6) Period 4 value of mean hourly wages,
(7) Rate of decline of mean hourly wages from periods J − 1 to J ,
(8) Peak value of mean hours worked.
These parameters include:
(a) The distribution of initial human capital and ability, Λ(h1, a),
(b) The depreciation rate, δ,
(c) The utility of leisure parameter, ψ,
(d) The returns to scale of H with respect to existing human capital, φ.
All parameters are jointly determined, but I discuss the link between each parameter
and a particular moment in the data.
Distribution of Life-cycle Earnings The distribution of initial human cap-
ital and learning ability, Λ(h1, a) is closely linked to the distribution of earnings over
10See Guvenen et al. (2014). Given the utility specification above, Frisch elasticity of non-leisure
time m = n+ s is εF =
1−m
mγ . In the data, mean annual hours worked peak in period 3, at a value
of 2,233. With an assumed time endowment of 5,110 hours, this implies that m¯data3 ≈ .44. Since the
model is calibrated to match this moment, we are left with γ =
1−m¯data3
.6m¯data3
≈ 2.
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the life-cycle (moments 1-5). I assume Λ(h1, a) is log Normal, which leaves me with
five distribution parameters to set: (µh1 , µa, σh1 , σa, ρh1,a).
The mean values of initial human capital and learning ability, µh1 and µa, are
key for mean earnings in period 1 and the peak of mean earnings, respectively. The
variance of initial human capital and ability, σh1 and σa, are key for the variance of
log earnings in period 1 and the peak of earnings variance, respectively.
The correlation of initial human capital and ability, ρh1,a is key for the variance
of annual earnings in period 2. Huggett et al. (2006) show that a low correlation
between initial human capital and ability will cause the spread in earnings to decline
over the beginning of the life-cycle as the earnings of high-a/low-h1 individuals catch
up to the earnings of low-a/high-h1 individuals. To be consistent with the nearly
monotonic increase in the variance of earnings observed in the data the correlation
parameter must be sufficiently large, so that individuals endowed with a high a also
tend to have high endowments of h1.
Wages at the End of the Life-cycle The depreciation rate δ has a tight
relationship with the decline in the mean hourly wage rate observed over the final
period of the data, w¯DJ /w¯
D
J−1. To understand the link between the human capital
depreciation rate and the decline in hourly wages at the end of the life-cycle, recall
from Section 1.2.1 that the human capital stock of a worker evolves according to
hj+1 = (1− δ)hj +H(hj, nj, sj; a) .
Therefore, the decline in a worker’s hourly wage from period J − 1 to J , wJ
wJ−1
, can
be written
23
wJ
wJ−1
=
ωhJnJ/(nJ + sJ)
ωhJ−1nJ−1/(nJ−1 + sJ−1)
≈ hJ
hJ−1
= (1− δ) + H(hJ−1, nJ−1, sJ−1, a)
hJ−1
.
(1.11)
The approximate equality follows from the fact that sJ = 0, since the return to learn-
ing is zero in period J , and sJ−1 ≈ 0, which approximately holds because the return
to learning is nearly zero in the period before retirement.
In the BP specification, H ≈ 0 since sJ−1 ≈ 0, which means (1.11) approximately
reduces to (1− δ). Therefore the calibrated value of δ can be approximated by
δBP ≈ 1− w¯DJ /w¯DJ−1.
Alternatively, in the LBD specification H > 0 since nJ−1 is the relevant human
capital input and is positive. Therefore, the calibrated value of δ in the LBD case
will be larger than in the BP case, holding w¯DJ /w¯
D
J−1 constant. Specifically, denoting
x = (h1, a), the calibrated value of δ in the LBD case is given by
δLBD = 1− w¯DJ /w¯DJ−1 +
∫
ahφ−1J−1(x)n
θ
J−1(x)dΛ(x) > 1− w¯DJ /w¯DJ−1 ≈ δBP . (1.12)
Curvature of Mean Earnings The parameter φ governs the returns to scale
of the human capital function with respect to existing human capital. All else equal,
low values of φ generate large human capital growth rates early in the life-cycle and
lower human capital growth rates later in the life-cycle. In the other direction, higher
values of φ produce human capital growth rates which are more constant over the
life-cycle. This means that lowering φ will tend to front-load wage growth towards
the early part of the life-cycle. Moment (6), the value of mean hourly wages in the
middle period of the working life, will therefore have a tight relationship with φ.
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Mean Hours Worked over the Life-cycle I assume that individuals are
endowed with 5110 hours per year, which translates to 14 hours per day. The utility
of leisure parameter ψ is set to match the life-cycle peak of mean hours worked in
the data, which is 43% of the time endowment, or approximately 2,200 hours per year.
Findings: No age-variation in parameters Columns (1) and (2) of Table
1.2 summarize the calibration outcomes for the baseline BP and LBD models. Figure
1.4 plots the mean life-cycle profile of earnings, hourly wages, and hours worked for
these models.
Table 1.2: Parameters Targeted to Data Moments, No Age-Variation in Parameters.
(1) (2)
Parameter Description BP: LBD:
Basic Basic
(µh1 , µa) Population means for log(h1, a) (5.0,2.1) (4.8,4.2)
(σh1 , σa) Variance of log(h1, a) (.39,.14) (.37,.24)
ρh¯1a Correlation between (h1, a) .97 .99
φ Curvature of H(h, n, s) w.r.t. h .47 .2
ψ Weight on utility of leisure 0.87 1.32
δ Human capital depreciation rate .023 .559
The most notable differences in parameter values are that the human capital re-
turns to scale parameter, φ, is much smaller, and the depreciation rate, δ, is much
larger under LBD versus BP. This is because workers in the LBD model continue to
learn (via time spent producing) throughout the life-cycle: without sharply decreasing
returns to scale or a high depreciation rate, LBD would counterfactually predict that
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Figure 1.4: Means for the Data and the Models without Age-Varying Parameters.
Note: Displays the age effects in mean earnings, hourly wages, and hours worked.
The figure plots the predictions of the BP and LBD models without age-varying
parameters against estimates from the data. To construct the data age profiles, I
partition ages into periods according to the following schedule: Period 1, ages 23-28;
Period 2, 29-33; Period 3, 34-39; Period 4, 40-44; Period 5, 45-50; Period 6, 51-55;
Period 7, 56-60.
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(c) Hours Worked
mean hourly wages continue to grow even among older workers. By contrast, workers
in the BP model choose to stop investing as they age and the return to learning falls
(see Section 1.5 for a more detailed discussion). Therefore, BP is able to produce a
decline in hourly wages at the end of the life-cycle even though φ is closer to one and
δ is close to zero.
The most notable difference in life-cycle predictions is that the LBD and BP mod-
els generate substantially different paths for mean hours worked over the second half
of the life-cycle. Specifically, period J hours in the BP model are 3% below their
peak, and period J hours in the LBD model are 27% below their peak, relative to a
7% decline in the data. 11
11The large declines in hours worked predicted by the LBD model are similar in magnitude to
previous predictions in the LBD literature: for example, see Imai and Keane (2004).
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The first order condition in (1.8), which I partially restate below, explains why
the hours decline in the BP model is small:
(
−∂uj
∂nj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Leisure)
=
(
λωhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Earning)
.
Hourly wages decline in the final periods of the model, which lowers theMV (Earning)
term on the right hand side of the above equation. In response, leisure increases in
order to restore the first order condition between leisure and production. However,
the decline in wages in the data, which the model has been calibrated to reproduce, is
only 2%. Therefore the increase in leisure in the model, and corresponding decrease
in hours worked, is small.
Alternatively, the hours decline in the basic LBD model is much larger than what
is observed in the data. The first order condition in (1.7), which I restate below,
shows why this is the case:(
−∂uj
∂nj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Leisure)
=
(
λωhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Earning)
+ λ
(
∂hj+1
∂nj
)[J−j∑
k=1
R−kωnj+k
(
∂hj+k
∂hj+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Learning)
.
As workers age in the LBD model, leisure increases not only in response to falling
wages, but also in response to falling marginal values of learning. The marginal value
of learning falls as workers approach retirement because the number of periods re-
maining before retirement, J−j, during which newly produced human capital can be
used, is declining to zero. This second term is not present in the production/leisure
first order condition for the BP model because individuals do not accumulate human
capital through production in this model.
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1.4.3 Parameters Targeted to Data: Allowing Age-Variation in Parameters
Next I show that allowing some model parameters to vary with age is sufficient to
bring the profile of mean hours in both human capital models in line with the data. I
first allow the utility of leisure to evolve at a constant rate over the life-cycle, ψ1 = ψ
and ψj+1 = ψj(1 + gψ). This change affects the MV (Leisure) terms in (1.7) and
(1.8) for older workers. All else equal, larger values of gψ increase the marginal value
of leisure among older workers relative to younger workers, which tends to generate
larger life-cycle declines in hours worked. Put simply, assuming that older workers
value leisure more will tend to increase the size of the hours decline in the run up to
retirement.
Second, I impose ψj = ψ ∀j, but allow the depreciation rate to evolve at a constant
rate, δ1 = δ and δj+1 = δj(1+gδ). Third, I impose ψj = ψ and δj = δ ∀j, but allow the
learning ability of individuals to evolve at a constant rate, a1 = a and aj+1 = aj(1+ga).
These latter two changes affect the MV (Earning) and MV (Learning) terms in (1.7)
and (1.8) for older workers. All else equal, larger values of gδ or smaller values of ga
decrease the marginal value of learning among older workers, which tends to generate
smaller life-cycle declines in hours worked in the LBD model. Put simply, assuming
that the value of learning for older workers is small well before retirement—either
because they struggle to learn anything new or because they forget most of what
they do learn—will tend to dampen the decline in hours in the run up to retirement.
In all three cases, after I add one of the parameters gψ, gδ, or ga, I introduce an
additional empirical target: mean hours worked in the final working period J . The
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calibration process for all other parameters remains the same as was described in
Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2.
Findings: Allowing for age-variation in parameters Columns (1)-(3) in
Table 1.3 summarize the calibration outcomes for the BP and LBD models with age
variation in model parameters. Figure 1.5 plots the mean life-cycle profile of earnings,
hourly wages, and hours worked for the models in columns (1) and (3). Figure 1.6
plots the life-cycle profile of the log variance of earnings for these models.
Table 1.3: Parameters Targeted to Data Moments, with Age-Variation in Parame-
ters.
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Description BP: LBD: LBD:
gψ gδ ga
(µh1 , µa) Population means for log(h1, a) (5.0,2.1) (4.8,4.0) (4.7,2.4)
(σh1 , σa) Variance of log(h1, a) (.39,.14) (.42,.52) (.38,.24)
ρh¯1a Correlation between (h1, a) .94 .94 .68
φ Curvature of H(h, n, s) w.r.t. h .47 .0 .4
ψ Weight on utility of leisure .79 1.21 .97
δ Human capital depreciation rate .023 .035 .079
(1 + gψ)
J−1 Lifetime growth in leisure utility 1.22 1 1
(1 + gδ)
J−2 Lifetime growth in depreciation 1 4.9 1
(1 + ga)
J−2 Lifetime growth in ability 1 1 0.26
Figure 1.5(c) shows that when I allow for age-dependence in parameters the mod-
els generate mean hours profiles which are quantitatively consistent with mean hours
in the data. The BP model featuring a 22% life-cycle increase in the value of leisure
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Figure 1.5: Means for the Data and the Models with Age-Varying Parameters.
Note: Displays the age effects for mean earnings, hourly wages, and hours worked.
The figure plots the predictions of the BP model featuring age-varying leisure
preferences and the LBD model featuring age-varying learning ability against
estimates from the data. To construct the data age profiles, I partition ages into
periods according to the following schedule: Period 1, ages 23-28; Period 2, 29-33;
Period 3, 34-39; Period 4, 40-44; Period 5, 45-50; Period 6, 51-55; Period 7, 56-60.
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reproduces the 7% decline in mean hours observed in the data. In the LBD model
allowing the depreciation rate of human capital to increase with age, or the learning
ability of workers to decrease with age, brings the hours decline in line with the data.
12
The primary takeaway from this exercise is that to be consistent with the distri-
bution of earnings, wages, and hours in the data, the LBD model must feature sub-
stantial life-cycle changes in some parameter. In particular, from their early twenties
12At first glance the simplest way of bringing the LBD prediction in line with the data would
be to make the opposite change, i.e. to decrease the value of leisure for older workers. However,
increasing hours worked in this manner increases human capital accumulation late in the working
life (since workers learn via production in the LBD model), which ceteris paribus would generate a
counterfactual wage increase among older workers. The human capital depreciation rate which is
required to eliminate this wage increase is in excess of 60% per year, which is an order of magnitude
larger than depreciation rates typically used in the literature. Therefore I do not consider this to be
a reasonable solution.
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Figure 1.6: Variance of log Earnings for the Data and the Models with Age-Varying
Parameters.
Note: Displays the age effects for the log variance of earnings. The figure plots
the predictions of the BP model featuring age-varying leisure preferences and the
LBD model featuring age-varying learning ability against estimates from the data.
To construct the data age profiles, I partition ages into periods according to the
following schedule: Period 1, ages 23-28; Period 2, 29-33; Period 3, 34-39; Period 4,
40-44; Period 5, 45-50; Period 6, 51-55; Period 7, 56-60.
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to their late fifties individuals must experience either a 390% increase in their human
capital depreciation rate or an 74% decline in their learning ability (see Table 1.3).
By contrast, the BP model with no age variation in parameters matches the empirical
profiles fairly well, and the BP model with a small (22%) lifetime increase in the value
of leisure matches the profiles extremely well.
1.5 Earnings Growth in Ben-Porath and Learning by Doing
Section 1.4 found that the baseline BP model was more consistent with empirical
profiles for earnings, wages, and hours levels than the baseline LBD, but that these
profiles were not sufficient to differentiate between richer versions of BP and LBD. In
this section, I ask whether an additional set of moments—the life-cycle declines in the
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variance of earnings growth rates—is sufficient to differentiate BP and LBD. I show
that the calibrated BP version of the model accounts for nearly all of the life-cycle
decline in the variance of wage and earning growth rates, while the calibrated LBD
models account for less than half of this decline.
Figure 1.7 plots the age profiles for the variance in earnings growth rates gener-
ated by the BP and LBD models. The dashed red (circles) line corresponds to the
BP calibration in Column (3) of Table 1.3; dashed blue lines correspond to the LBD
calibration for Column (4) (squares) and (5) (triangles). The data profile corresponds
to Figure 1.3. 13
I normalize the initial value of all four profiles in Figure 1.7 to zero, and focus on
the change in these profiles over the life-cycle. This normalization has two benefits.
First, because I normalize the level of the data profile I do not need to address mea-
surement error (as long as the error is not age-dependent). Second, as I document
in detail in Appendix C, imposing different sample restrictions on the data generate
drastically different levels for the variance of earnings growth, but have little impact
on the life-cycle decline in the profile.
The key takeaway from Figure 1.7 is that the BP profile accounts for roughly
90% of the life-cycle decline observed in the data, while the LBD profiles account for
between 11% and 31% of the life-cycle decline.
13The 5-year wage growth rates in Figure 1.3 approximately correspond to one-period wage growth
rates, since a period represents 38/7 ≈ 5.4 years. Therefore I compare age effects for these growth
rates against 1-period growth rates produced by the model. The moments for 6-year wage growth
rates are very similar to those in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.7: Variance of 1-Period Earnings Growth Rates in the Models and the
Data.
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings growth
rates. The figure plots the predictions of the BP model featuring age-varying
leisure preferences (circles), the LBD model featuring age-varying learning ability
(triangles), and the LBD model featuring age-varying depreciation rates (squares)
against estimates from the data. To construct the data age profiles, I partition ages
into periods according to the following schedule: Period 1, ages 23-28; Period 2,
29-33; Period 3, 34-39; Period 4, 40-44; Period 5, 45-50; Period 6, 51-55; Period 7,
56-60.
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Figure 1.8 demonstrates why BP predicts a large decline in the variance of earn-
ings growth, but LBD does not. With BP, time spent learning declines to zero as
workers approach retirement. Therefore, while the earnings of young high ability
workers grow much faster than the earnings of young low ability workers, this growth
gap dies out over the life-cycle as workers stop investing. In the LBD model, on the
other hand, time spent learning is flat over the life-cycle, as shown by Figure 1.8(a).
This means that the earnings of high ability workers continue to grow relatively faster
than the earnings of low ability workers throughout the life-cycle, even though the
average rate of earnings growth falls as workers age.
Summary of Life-cycle Predictions Sections 1.4-1.5 compare the life-cycle
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Figure 1.8: Mean Time Spent Learning in Ben-Porath and Learning by Doing.
Note: Plot displays age effects for mean time spent learning in the BP and LBD
models corresponding to columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.3, respectively.
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predictions of the BP and LBD models to data on US workers. I find that a BP
model (with little or no age variation in model parameters) endogenously produces
life-cycle patterns which are quantitatively consistent with the empirical distribution
of earnings, wages, and hours levels, as well as with heterogeneity in earnings growth
rates. I find that the LBD model is consistent with the empirical levels profiles (if
I allow model parameters to vary with age), but that it is inconsistent with hetero-
geneity in earnings growth.
The models predict different earnings growth patterns because workers in the BP
model choose to spend less time learning as they age and the return to learning falls,
while workers in the LBD model choose to keep time spent learning constant with
age. The intuition is that workers in the BP model can separately adjust time spent
learning and earning as the returns to these activities change over the life-cycle, while
workers in the LBD model cannot.
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Section 1.2.3 argued that this same intuition explains why the models predict dif-
ferent outcomes when the relative returns to earning and learning are altered by a
change in government policy. Specifically, a policy change that lowers the return to
learning relative to the return to earning causes workers in a BP model to spend less
time learning and more time earning; in the LBD model, by contrast, both activities
will move together one-to-one. In the final section of this paper I apply these insights
to counterfactual increases in the top marginal labor tax rate for the US. I find that
the quantitative impact of policy crucially depends on whether a BP or LBD human
capital process is assumed.
1.6 The Impact of Tax Progressivity on Human Capital Accumulation for
Ben-Porath and Learning by Doing
In this section I quantitatively analyze the response of workers in the BP and
LBD models to changes in the progressivity of labor income taxes. I focus on two
separate tax changes. Section 1.6.1 studies an increase in marginal tax rates imposed
on the highest 1% of earners. Section 1.6.2 studies a revenue-neutral change from the
current (progressive) US income tax to a proportional scheme.
My analyses are complementary to work by Guvenen et al. (2014), and Badel and
Huggett (2014). These studies use a Ben-Porath model to show that a progressive
tax on earnings can generate quantitatively large reductions in human capital invest-
ment among high earners, leading to large reductions in the lifetime earnings of these
individuals. The intuition is that, because earnings tend to increase over the course
of a worker’s life, under a progressive earnings tax workers typically expect to face
a higher marginal tax rate in the future than they experience this year. Since the
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return to learning depends on future marginal tax rates, while the return to earning
depends on current marginal tax rates, progressive tax schemes lower the return to
learning, relative to the return to earning, for most workers, which discourages human
capital investment.
A question that the above authors do not address is whether their choice of a
specific human capital technology is quantitatively important. I find that the learn-
ing and earning decisions of workers in the BP model respond much more to the tax
changes than those in the LBD model. This suggests that the authors’ choice of a
BP technology is a key driver of their findings.
1.6.1 Increasing Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1% of Earners
I conduct the tax experiments within the BP model featuring age variation in
leisure preferences (gψ > 0), and the LBD model featuring age variation in learning
ability (ga < 0), as these are the versions of each model which are most consistent
with the life-cycle earnings and hours data for US workers. I use the parameter values
presented in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.3, respectively.
The baseline government policy is modeled after the 2009 US federal labor income
tax regime. The statutory average tax curve can be approximated by the logarithmic
function 14 τ(y/y¯) = .1129 + .0355log(y/y¯). To avoid modeling the complex set of
deductions which are available to households I simply assume that all households are
14Guner et al. (2014) provide parametric estimates of tax functions which approximate federal
income tax liabilities for US households. Their estimates correspond to liabilities as a function
of total household income. To isolate the effects of a change in the labor income tax I opt to
use statutory federal tax rates for labor income, but make convenient use of their tax function to
approximate these rates.
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able to avoid one third of this tax. With this assumption, the tax schedule I use in
the model closely resembles the empirical findings by Guner et al. (2014) based on
administrative data about actual taxes paid by a large sample of US households.
Figure 1.9: Schedule of Earnings Taxes.
Note: The figure displays schedule of (a) average, and (b) marginal earnings tax
rates as a function of earnings. Earnings are expressed as multiples of the mean
earnings level in the economy. The solid line depicts the US statutory tax schedule.
The short dashed line depicts the approximation of this schedule by a function
which is linear in the log of mean earnings. See text for details on these tax functions.
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Figure 1.9 plots the resulting (a) average and (b) marginal taxes as a function of
multiples of the mean labor income of households in the 2009 sample of the PSID.
The parametric tax function, and the corresponding marginal tax function, are also
plotted in Figure 1.9. The plot shows that workers with labor earnings equal to one
tenth of mean labor earnings in the economy face a marginal tax rate of 7%; this rate
rises monotonically to 23% for workers whose labor earnings are ten times mean la-
bor earnings. I assume that in the baseline policy the government rebates all revenue
back to workers lump sum. When computing the equilibrium I assume a small open
economy and no population growth.
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I analyze the steady state impact of increasing marginal tax rates for all earnings
above the 99th earnings percentile in the baseline economy. Specifically, in both the
LBD and BP models I find the level of earnings e1% such that 1% of workers have
earnings above this level: in the BP model e1% is 4.0 times mean earnings in the econ-
omy, while in the LBD model e1% is 4.3 times mean earnings in the economy. I then
replace the marginal tax rate imposed on all earnings above e1% with a 73% marginal
rate. Diamond and Saez (2011) use a static model with exogenous human capital
to argue that this is the marginal tax rate which maximizes the revenue the govern-
ment can collect from the top 1% of earners in the US. To isolate the impact of the
tax change I ignore government budget balancing considerations after the tax change.
Findings Table 1.4 summarizes the steady state change in hours worked, time
spent learning, earnings, and revenue contributed by workers who earned above e1%
at some point in their working life in the baseline economy. The change in hours is
similar between BP and LBD, 13% versus 16%. However, the change in time spent
learning is drastically different between the two models. In the LBD model time spent
learning (production) falls by 16%. Notice that the change in time spent learning in
the LBD model is the same as the change in hours worked: this is because in the
LBD model time spent learning and time spent working move together one-to-one by
construction. By contrast, in the BP model workers can separately reduce investment
(since the return to investing is now relatively lower for high earners) and increase
time in production (since the return to earning is now relatively higher for high earn-
ers). As a result, time spent learning under BP falls nearly three times as much as
under LBD: 44% versus 16%.
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Table 1.4: Steady State Impact of the Tax Change on the Top 1% of Earners.
% Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
Time Spent Learning Hours Worked Earnings Taxes Paid
BP -43.8% -13.2% -38.3% -36.4%
LBD -16.1% -16.1% -27.0% -7.4%
Ratio 2.7 0.8 1.4 4.9
The larger decrease in time spent learning in the BP model causes the average
stock of human capital among high earners to decrease more in the BP model. This
has important consequences for the earnings of these workers, and the quantity of
taxes they pay. Earnings among affected workers fall by 38% in the BP model, which
is 42 percent, or 11 percentage points, larger than the decline generated by the LBD
model. Taxes paid by top earners decline by 36% in the BP model but only 7% in the
LBD model. The reason the drop in taxes paid for the LBD model is small relative
to the drop in earnings is because some workers in the LBD model continue to earn
above e1% after the tax change, and so are subject to the increased marginal tax rate.
By contrast, in the BP model investment falls by so much after the tax change that
effectively no workers pay the higher marginal rate.
In short, the long run impact of an increase in marginal tax rates on high earners
crucially depends on whether a BP or LBD model is assumed.
1.6.2 Change from the Current US tax scheme to a Proportional Scheme
Next I analyze the steady state impact of a more broad-based tax change, from
the 2009 US federal earnings tax regime to a proportional earnings tax. In contrast
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to the tax reform in the previous section, this tax change tends to raise the return
to learning relative to earning for most workers. The reason is that after the tax
change workers will face identical marginal tax rates on their future and current in-
come, while before the tax change workers tended to face higher marginal tax rates
on future income relative to current income (since income increases over the life-cycle
for most workers).
Figure 1.10: Schedule of Earnings Taxes.
Note: The figure displays schedule of (a) average, and (b) marginal earnings tax
rates as a function of earnings. Earnings are expressed as multiples of the mean
earnings level in the economy. The solid line depicts the US statutory tax schedule.
The short dashed line depicts the approximation of this schedule by a function which
is linear in the log of mean earnings. The dot-dashed line depicts the proportional
tax rate imposed on the BP model; the long-dashed line depicts the proportional tax
rate imposed on the LBD model. See text for details on these tax functions.
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Like the previous section, I conduct the tax experiment within the BP and LBD
models displayed in columns (1) and (3) in Table 1.3. The proportional tax rate is
set so that the revenue it generates is equal to the revenue generated by the original
US tax scheme: the resulting values are an 11.8% rate in the BP model and a 11.5%
rate in the LBD model. Figure 1.10 displays the initial US tax scheme, as well as
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the proportional tax schemes for the BP and LBD models. To isolate the impact
of the earnings tax change on worker decisions I assume that in both tax regimes
the government rebates all tax revenue to households in a lump sum transfer. When
computing aggregate values I assume a small open economy and no population growth.
Findings Table 1.5 summarizes the steady state change in economic aggre-
gates induced by the tax change. The most striking effects of the tax change are with
respect to the first column: switching from a modestly progressive labor income tax
to a proportional labor income tax increases aggregate time spent learning (invest-
ment) by 11.7% in a BP economy. The size of this increase is six times the change in
aggregate time spent learning (production) in the LBD economy. Aggregate earnings
in the BP economy increase by 3.7%, which is 1 percentage point, or 37 percent,
larger than the change in the LBD economy.
Table 1.5: Steady State Impact of the Tax Change on Aggregate Variables.
% Change, % Change, % Change,
Time Spent Learning Hours Worked Earnings
BP +11.7% +2.3% +3.7%
LBD +1.9% +1.9% +2.7%
Ratio 6.2 1.2 1.4
To summarize, the aggregate effects of a revenue neutral change from a modestly
progressive labor income tax to a proportional labor income tax are substantially
larger in a BP environment than in a LBD environment.
When interpreting the results of the policy experiments in this section, it is im-
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portant to remember that I have assumed the distribution of initial human capital
and learning ability is policy invariant. Just as human capital after age 23 responded
to changes in the progressivity of income taxes, it is likely that early human capital
investment (before age 23) would also respond to these changes. 15 The findings
presented here can therefore be viewed as a conservative floor for the true impact of
these policy changes.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper constructs a life-cycle human capital model which features either a BP
or LBD technology. The central difference between BP and LBD is that in the BP
case workers face a tradeoff between earning and learning, while in the LBD model
earning and learning occur simultaneously. The two questions this paper asks are:
First, to what extent are BP and LBD consistent with empirical life-cycle patterns
of earnings and hours worked for US workers? Second, are the life-cycle predictions
of these models informative about the impact of government policies on worker deci-
sions?
My findings are as follows. First, both models are consistent with the life-cycle
distribution of earnings and hours levels for male workers in the US. Second, I find
that the LBD model requires substantial age variation in key parameters in order to
replicate these patterns, while the BP model does not. Third, the BP model is con-
sistent with the observed heterogeneity in earnings growth over the life-cycle, while
the LBD model is not.
15For example, see Krueger and Ludwig (2013), who study the effect of taxation on education
decisions.
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Finally, I show that the model features which generate different life-cycle pre-
dictions across BP and LBD are the same features which generate different policy
implications across the two models. Specifically, I show that workers in the two mod-
els respond differently to a change in the return to learning relative to the return to
earning, and that these relative returns vary both over the life-cycle and across policy
regimes. I demonstrate that the difference in policy implications can be quantitatively
important by analyzing the impact of an increase in marginal tax rates imposed on
the top 1% of earners in both models. I find that, among affected workers, steady
state time spent learning decreases by 44% in the BP model relative to 16% in the
LBD model as a result of this tax change. This leads to a decrease in earnings of
38% and a decrease in taxes paid of 36% for affected workers in the BP model, rel-
ative to decreases of 27% and 7%, respectively, in the LBD model. I also show that
a revenue-neutral change from the current US labor income tax to a proportional
scheme generates larger steady state increases in time spent learning and earnings in
the BP model.
In sum, I demonstrate that a simple economic story in which workers respond
optimally to a tradeoff between earnings today and earning potential tomorrow can
explain a broad set of life-cycle facts for US workers. I also show that when this
tradeoff exists, human capital investment decisions and earnings will be sensitive to
changes in the returns to human capital investment. This suggests that policies which
affect the return to human capital investment—such as changes to tax progressivity,
education subsidies, or pension reform—will generate quantitatively large endogenous
responses in key macroeconomic variables.
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Chapter 2
REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY:
THE EARNINGS CAP AND ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL
2.1 Introduction
Old age Social Security benefits in the US are funded by a 10.6% payroll tax up
to a cap, currently set at $118,500. In recent years roughly 15% of earnings were
in excess of the cap, and therefore not subject to the payroll tax, with about 7%
of covered US workers reporting some earnings in excess of the cap in a given year.
During the 113th US Congress (01/2013 - 01/2015), 6 separate bills were introduced
which sought to eliminate this cap. Additionally, the two leading contenders for the
Democratic presidential nomination, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, have said
they would consider raising or eliminating the earnings cap if they were to win the
presidency. 1 Despite calls for removing the earnings cap, there has been very little
work examining the impact of such a policy change. This paper quantitatively as-
sesses the aggregate and distributional impact that changing the earnings cap would
have on the US economy.
An increase in the earnings cap is likely to have important implications for the
earnings of workers for three reasons. First, eliminating the cap will substantially
lower the marginal after-tax wages of many high earners. Workers with earnings
1See Whitman and Shoffner (2011) for details on earnings above the Social Security cap. The
six bills which would eliminate the earnings cap, some of which were introduced to both the House
of Representatives and the Senate, are: S.567 and H.R. 3118, S.308 and H.R. 649, S.500 and H.R.
1029, S.2455, H.R. 1374, H.R. 5306. See Ehrenfreund and Gearan (2015) for details on the positions
of Clinton and Sanders.
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above the current cap already face marginal tax rates between 25% − 39.6% due to
the federal income tax. Subjecting the marginal earnings of these workers to the
10.6% payroll tax would increase these marginal tax rates to 35.6% − 50.2%, which
would lower the after-tax wages of these workers by 14%− 18%. Such a large change
in after-tax wages could potentially generate large reductions in hours by affected
workers.
Second, recent work by Guvenen et al. (2014); Badel and Huggett (2014); and
Blandin (2015) shows that policies which disproportionately raise marginal tax rates
on high earners reduce the returns to human capital investment. Since eliminating
the earnings cap increases marginal tax rates only for workers with sufficiently high
earnings, this policy change could generate quantitatively large reductions in human
capital investment, causing the lifetime wages and earnings of these workers to decline.
Finally, eliminating the earnings cap is likely to have a large impact on the earn-
ings of high earners because the current earnings cap generates a non-convexity in
the budget set of workers. Using a simplified model I theoretically demonstrate that
an increase in marginal tax rates on high earners produces a larger decrease in labor
(and therefore earnings) when I model this non-convexity, relative to an identical tax
increase in a model without this non convexity. The intuition is that, with a non-
convex budget, a worker can be nearly indifferent between two points on his budget
line which are far apart from each other. Therefore, a small tax increase can cause a
discrete decline in the worker’s labor choice.
In order to evaluate the impact of a change in the earnings tax, then, several
model features seem crucial. Workers should have heterogeneous earnings, so that
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some are directly affected by the tax change while others are not. The government
policies should include both the Social Security payroll tax and the federal income
tax, to ensure that changes in after-tax wages are realistic. Finally, the labor supply
and human capital of workers should be endogenous, since the tax change will impact
the return to working and investing for high earners. I construct an equilibrium life-
cycle model that includes these features. Individuals are born as 23 year old adults
endowed with an initial level of human capital and a learning ability. These initial
endowments are heterogeneous across workers. In each period workers decide how to
divide their time between leisure, production, and human capital investment. Work-
ers are subject to a borrowing constraint, but can save via a riskless asset.
The benchmark government policy against which reforms are measured is a pay-
as-you-go pension system modeled after the existing Social Security system in the
US, and an income tax modeled after income tax rates in the US. The benchmark
model is calibrated to reproduce age profiles for mean annual earnings, hourly wages,
and hours worked over the life-cycle, as well as the variance of earnings. I use my
model to analyze the steady state impact of several reforms to the earnings cap.
To begin I consider the impact of eliminating the earnings cap with no other
changes relative to the benchmark government policy; this can be thought of as using
the additional revenue from Social Security taxes to extend the solvency of the Social
Security trust fund. Next, I consider two reforms which eliminate the earnings cap
but do not have any impact on the annual Social Security deficit: the first lowers
the Social Security tax rate until the deficit is unchanged, while the second increases
benefits by a lump sum amount until the deficit is unchanged. The latter reform
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captures key elements of the Strengthening Social Security Act of 2013, a bill recently
introduced to the US Senate and House of Representatives.
My main findings are as follows:
(1) Eliminating the earnings cap generates large reductions in aggregate output
and consumption, between 2.1-3.1% across the three reforms I consider. Part of this
decline is due to a lower physical capital stock in the economy, as households with
high earnings save less in response to lower after-tax income levels. The decline in
output is also driven by a lower supply of human capital. Individuals endowed with
initial human capital and learning ability both in the top 10% of the population ac-
count for about half of the decline in the supply of human capital, and the entire
decline in the supply of physical capital.
(2) The role of endogenous human capital is first order. When I do not allow the
life-cycle human capital profiles of workers to adjust across policy regimes, the change
in economic aggregates is roughly cut in half.
(3) Total federal tax revenues never increase by more than 1.2% in any reform.
While eliminating the earnings cap increases revenues from the payroll tax by up to
12%, the decline in output lowers revenues derived from the federal income tax.
(4) Despite large declines in output and small increases in revenue, roughly 2/3
of workers experience an increase in welfare after policy changes which eliminate the
earnings cap, for two reasons. First, in two of the reforms which eliminate the earn-
ings cap the supply of human capital in the economy falls more than the supply of
physical capital, so workers experience a small wage increase. Second, workers whose
earnings never exceed the earnings cap do not face higher tax rates, and in two re-
forms receive either a tax cut (reform 2) or more generous old age benefits (reform 3).
Welfare gains are typically small (below 1% in consumpetion equivalence (CE) terms)
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because the additional revenue generated by eliminating the earnings cap is small.
By contrast, among workers who are made worse off by eliminating the earnings cap,
expected welfare loss is 2.1-2.4% in CE terms, and exceeds 9% for workers on the low
end. It is somewhat surprising that roughly a third of workers are made worse off by
eliminating the earnings cap, even though less than 10% of workers earn above the
cap in a given year in the baseline model. The reason is that a larger share of workers,
27% of the population, earn in excess of the cap at some point in their lifetime in
the baseline model. In particular, while few workers earn above the cap in their 20’s,
over 20% of workers in their 50’s earn above the cap.
(5) Finally, I investigate the impact of lowering the earnings cap from its current
level, but raising the payroll tax rate to leave the Social Security deficit unchanged.
In contrast to the reforms that eliminate the earnings cap, which decrease output and
increase welfare for most workers, I find that decreasing the cap to a level near mean
earnings in the economy increases both output and welfare. Consumption increases
by 0.5%, output by 1.3%, and federal income tax revenues by 2.8%. Over 95% of
workers in the economy experience an increase in welfare, on average by 1.2% in CE
terms. Workers with sufficiently high lifetime earnings benefit because they face a
smaller tax burden and experience only a small reduction in old age benefits. Workers
with low lifetime earnings experience no direct change in their Social Security bene-
fits, though they do face a slightly higher payroll tax rate. Lastly, all workers benefit
from lower interest rates and higher wage rates after the reform, as physical capital
in the economy increases to a greater extent than human capital.
Background This paper relates to two strands of literature. The first strand
is a set of recent papers that analyze the link between tax increases on high earners
and changes in government revenue. Guner et al. (2015) use a life-cycle model with
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heterogeneous workers and continuous labor supply decisions to show that increasing
tax rates on the top 5% of US households can at most generate a 2% increase in total
tax revenue. Badel and Huggett (2014) is most closely related to this project. The
authors study the Laffer Curve for top earners in a heterogeneous agent model with
endogenous human capital accumulation. They show that, relative to a model with
exogenous wages, their model produces a Laffer Curve for top earners which is flatter
and which peaks at a lower marginal tax rate. Both of these papers model Social Se-
curity benefits as a lump sum transfer which is common to all retirees, which implies
that workers do not consider the impact that their earnings have on their retirement
benefits, which is crucial for the analysis conducted in this paper. The tax changes
in this paper are also structured differently and targeted to a larger group of earners
relative to these other papers. Lastly, these papers do not consider the aggregate or
distributional impact of different uses of revenue.
My paper is also related to three papers which examine reforms to Social Security
within an endogenous human capital model. Wallenius (2013) asks what fraction
of the gap in labor supply among older workers between the US and Europe can
be explained by differences in Social Security rules. Kindermann (2015) argues that
pay-as-you-go retirement programs subsidize human capital investment relative to
programs which mandate personal retirement accounts. Fan, Fan et al. (2015) use
a life-cycle human capital model with endogenous retirement to show that reducing
Social Security benefits will increase labor force participation and human capital in-
vestment. These papers do not consider policies which change the payroll tax, or the
payroll earnings cap. 2
2Fan et al. (2015) do study the impact of the wholesale removal of the payroll tax. However, they
do this while leaving Social Security benefits in place, to decompose the effect of the current Social
Security system into its component effects, not in the context of a plausible policy evaluation.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out a simplified
model which demonstrates how reforming the Social Security earnings tax cap and
benefit rule impacts the labor and human capital investment decisions of workers.
Section 2.3 describes the full model economy and the Social Security system in the
benchmark model. Section 2.4 details the calibration of the benchmark model to the
US economy. Section 2.5 analyzes the aggregate and distributional impact of changes
to the earnings cap and the benefit rule. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Model of Social Security
This section presents two simple models to illustrate the impact that the Social
Security payroll tax and earnings cap have on the labor and human capital invest-
ment decisions of workers. Section 2.2.1 illustrates the role the earnings cap plays
in the labor decision of a worker in a static model. Section 2.2.2 illustrates the role
the earnings cap plays in the human capital investment decision of a worker in a
two period model. I show that eliminating the earnings cap depresses labor supply
and human capital investment weakly for workers with sufficiently high earnings. In
Section 2.2.1 I also show that the impact of a tax increase on high earners is larger
when the initial budget set of the worker is not convex: a special case of this is the
elimination of the Social Security earnings cap.
2.2.1 The Empact of the Earnings Cap on Labor
The model is static. There is a single worker and a single consumption good
c whose price is normalized to one. The worker decides how much time to spend
producing, n. The worker is paid a wage ω for each unit of time he spends in
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production. To minimize notation I impose ω = 1. The worker has preferences
over consumption and work represented by the utility function
u(c, n) = c+
ψn1/γ+1
1/γ + 1
,
where ψ < 0 and γ > 1. The assumption that utility is linear in consumption is not
necessary for the results in this section, but simplifies the analysis because it assumes
away any income effects.
There is also a government whose sole task is to operate a Social Security system.
The system has two components: an earnings tax and an old age benefit rule. Earn-
ings are taxed at a marginal rate τ up to some earnings level eˆ, beyond which they
are taxed at a marginal rate τˆ . Note that by setting τˆ = 0 I can replicate the earnings
cap feature of the current US Social Security system. For simplicity I assume that
old age benefits b are provided lump sum.
The worker chooses production time n and consumption c to maximize utility
subject to his budget constraint:
max
c,n
c+
ψn1/γ+1
1/γ + 1
s.t. c ≤ b+ n− τ min{n, eˆ} − τˆ max{n− eˆ, 0} .
As long as τˆ ≥ τ the worker’s problem is strictly concave. In this case the solution
is unique and the first order condition which sets the marginal benefit of working equal
to its marginal cost,
(1− τ1n<eˆ) (1− τˆ1n≥eˆ) = ψn1/γ , (2.1)
is sufficient. When τˆ > τ it may be the case that the marginal benefit of working
is strictly above the marginal cost when n < eˆ, and strictly below the marginal cost
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when n ≥ eˆ, since the marginal tax rate increases discretely at n = eˆ. In this case no
value of n satisfies (2.1), and the worker will choose n = eˆ.
By contrast, when τˆ < τ (for example, when τˆ = 0), the problem is no longer con-
cave. Now (2.1) is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient and may be satisfied
at two different values of n. This is because, in contrast to the previous case where
τˆ ≥ τ , as earnings increase to eˆ the marginal tax rate decreases discretely at n = eˆ.
If this tax decrease pushes the marginal benefit of working above the marginal cost,
then there will be two values of n which satisfy (2.1). In this case the optimal value
of n can be found by checking which value maximizes the objective. 3
Results 1 and 2 below characterize the effect that the top marginal tax rate τˆ has
on the labor decision of workers.
Result 1 Consider an increase in τˆ from τˆ 0 to τˆ ′. Denote the worker’s optimal labor
choice by n0 and n′, respectively. If n0 ≤ eˆ, then n′ = n0. If n0 > eˆ, then n′ < n0.
Proof First consider the case where n0 ≤ eˆ. If n0 provides weakly higher utility than
any other n > eˆ under τˆ 0, then n0 must provide strictly higher utility than any other
n > eˆ under τˆ ′. Further, if (2.1) is satisfied at n0 under τˆ 0, it is also satisfied at n0
under τˆ ′. Therefore, if n0 satisfies (2.1) under τˆ 0, n′ = n0. If no n satisfies (2.1) under
τˆ 0, then no n satisfies (2.1) under τˆ ′, so n′ = n0 = eˆ.
3In the case that both critical values of n yield the same value of the objective, the solution is not
unique. However, for a given tax scheme (τ, τˆ), there are a measure zero of parameter pairs (ψ, γ)
for which the solution is not unique. Results 1 and 2 ignore these cases.
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Next consider the case where n0 > eˆ. If n′ ≤ eˆ, then the claim is proved, so
supposed n′ > eˆ. Then (2.1) is satisfied by n0 under τˆ 0 and n′ under τˆ ′. But then
n′
n0
=
(
1− τˆ ′
1− τˆ 0
)γ
< 1 ,
so n′ < n0. 
Figure 2.1: Impact of a Tax Increase on High Earners.
Note: Displays the impact of a tax increase on high earners given (a) a starting
budget set which is convex, and (b) a starting budget set which is not convex. See
Result 2. When pretax earnings are below eˆ the slope of the budget line is −(1− τ)
(depicted in gray). Before the tax increase, when pretax earnings are above eˆ,
the slope of the budget line is −(1 − τa) and −(1 − τ b) in subfigures (a) and (b)
respectively (depicted in blue). After the tax increase, when pretax earnings are
above eˆ, the slope of the budget line is −(1− τ˜a) and −(1− τ˜ b) in subfigures (a) and
(b) respectively (depicted in red). The blue dashed indifference curves correspond
to a worker’s maximized utility before the tax change; the red dashed indifference
curves correspond to a worker’s maximized utility after the tax change.
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Result 2 Consider two increases in τˆ : from τa to τ˜a, and from τ b to τ˜ b, where
τ b < τ < τa. Assume that the tax increases are of the same size, i.e. 1−τ˜
a
1−τa =
1−τ˜b
1−τb .
Finally, consider two workers (ψ1, γ) and (ψ2, γ), where n
a
1 = n
b
2 > eˆ. Then n˜
b
1 ≤ n˜a2,
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and for some parameters the inequality is strict.
Proof First, note that n˜a2 ≥ eˆ; if not then (2.1) holds at n˜a2 and
1− τ = ψ(n˜a2)1/γ) > 1− τ˜a ,
which is a contradiction since τ < τa < τ˜a.
Second, if n˜b1 ≥ eˆ, then n˜b1 = n˜a2. If n˜b1 > eˆ, then (2.1) holds at both nb1 and n˜b1, so
nb1
(
1− τ˜ b
1− τ b
)γ
= n˜b1 > eˆ .
But then
na2
(
1− τ˜a
1− τa
)γ
= nb1
(
1− τ˜ b
1− τ b
)γ
> eˆ ,
so
n˜a2 = n
a
2
(
1− τ˜a
1− τa
)γ
= nb1
(
1− τ˜ b
1− τ b
)γ
= n˜b1 .
If n˜b1 = eˆ, then
nb1
(
1− τ˜ b
1− τ b
)γ
≤ n˜b1 = eˆ .
But then If n˜b1 = eˆ, then
na2
(
1− τ˜a
1− τa
)γ
= nb1
(
1− τ˜ b
1− τ b
)γ
≤ eˆ .
Since n˜a2 ≥ eˆ, n˜a2 = eˆ = n˜b1.
Finally, there exist values of (ψ1, γ) s.t. n˜
b
1 < eˆ, which implies n˜
b
1 < n˜
a
2. For
example, when τ˜ b ≥ τ and
(
1−τ
ψ1
)γ
< eˆ .
The goal of this section was to demonstrate two points. First, an increase in the
tax rate on high earners τˆ induces individuals to work less. An application of this
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result is that eliminating the Social Security earnings cap will cause workers with
high earnings to work less. Second, the impact of an increase of τˆ of a given size is
larger when τˆ < τ relative to when τˆ ≥ τ . This latter result is depicted graphically in
Figure 2.1. The next section demonstrates that the first result also applies to human
capital investment in a dynamic model.
2.2.2 The Impact of the Earnings Cap on Human Capital Investment
The model is now dynamic. There is one worker who lives for two periods, and
one consumption good c whose price is normalized to one. At the beginning of the
first period the worker is endowed with initial human capital h1 and learning ability
a which determines her skill in accumulating new human capital.
Workers are also endowed with a unit of time in each period. Time can be split
between two activities: production, n, and human capital investment, s. The period
pre-tax earnings of a worker who has human capital h and supplies n units of pro-
duction are ωhn, where ω = 1 is an exogenously determined wage rate set to one for
simplicity. A worker who has human capital h and invests s units of time will begin
the next period with
h′ = h+ ahsθ ,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter which determines the elasticity of future human cap-
ital with respect to investment.
There is a government whose sole task is to operate a Social Security program,
which has two components: an earnings tax and an old age benefit rule. Earnings are
taxed at a marginal rate τ up to some earnings level eˆ, beyond which they are taxed
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at a marginal rate τˆ . For simplicity I assume that old age benefits b are provided
lump sum.
Workers have preferences over lifetime consumption (c1, c2) given by u(c1)+u(c2),
and can save or borrow at a risk free interest rate r. Each period workers make
decisions about production n, investment s, consumption c, and savings x in order
to maximize their lifetime utility, subject to a lifetime budget constraint and human
capital constraints:
max
{nj ,sj ,cj ,xj}2j=1
u(c1) + u(c2)
s.t. c1 + x1 = h1n1 − τ min{h1n1, eˆ} − τˆ max{h1n1 − eˆ, 0} ;
c2 = b+ x1(1 + r) + h2n2 − τ min{h2n2, eˆ} − τˆ max{h2n2 − eˆ, 0} ;
h2 = h1 + ah1s
θ
1 ;
nj + sj = 1 ; x2 = 0 .
A few observations greatly simplify the worker’s problem. First, workers will set
s2 = 0 and n2 = 1, since the return to human capital investment in the final period
of life is zero. Second, since utility only depends on consumption and there are no
borrowing/ lending constraints, the optimal time allocation decisions are simply those
which maximize the present value of lifetime income. Therefore, the time allocation
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decisions which solve the worker’s full problem can be found by solving the simpler
problem:
max
s∈[0,1]
h1(1− s)− τ min{ h1(1− s) , eˆ } − τˆ max{ h1(1− s)− eˆ , 0 }
+
(
1
1 + r
)
[ h2 − τ min{ h2 , eˆ } − τˆ max{ h2 − eˆ , 0 } ]
s.t. h2 = h1 + ah1s
θ .
Result 3 shows that increasing the marginal tax rate on high earners τˆ lowers the
optimal human capital investment choice of the worker.
Result 3 Consider an increase in τˆ from τˆ 0 to τˆ ′. Denote the worker’s optimal labor
choice in period 1 by s0 and s′, and the resulting period 2 human capital by h02 and
h′2, respectively. Then s
′ ≤ s0, and the inequality is strict whenever h1(1 − s0) < eˆ
and h02 > eˆ.
Proof First consider the case where before-tax earnings in period 1 exceed eˆ: h1(1−
s0) ≥ eˆ. Suppose towards contradiction that s′ > s0, and consider the impact of
increasing investment from s0 to s′ given some top tax rate τˆ . Doing so would
decrease the worker’s period 1 earnings by
(1− τˆ) min{ h1[(1−s0)− (1−s′)] , h1(1−s0)− eˆ }+(1−τ) max{ eˆ−h1(1−s′) , 0 } ,
and would increase the present value of the worker’s period 2 earnings by
(1− τˆ)
(
1
1 + r
)
(h′2 − h02) .
In the case that s′ ≥ eˆ, since s0 is optimal given τˆ = τˆ 0, it must be that
(1− τˆ 0) ( 1
1+r
)
(h′2 − h02)
(1− τˆ 0)[h1(1− s0)− h1(1− s′)] < 1 . (2.2)
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Therefore, it must also be that (2.2) continues to hold when τˆ 0 is replaced by τˆ ′ > τˆ 0,
which implies s′ is not optimal given τˆ ′. In the case that s′ < eˆ, since s0 is optimal
given τˆ = τˆ 0, it must be that
(1− τˆ 0) ( 1
1+r
)
(h′2 − h02)
(1− τˆ 0)[h1(1− s0)− eˆ] + (1− τ)(eˆ− h1(1− s′) < 1 . (2.3)
Since the left hand side of (2.3) would be strictly lower if τˆ 0 was replaced by τˆ ′, s′
cannot be optimal given τˆ ′. Therefore, when h1(1− s0) ≥ eˆ, s′ ≤ s0.
Next consider the case where h1(1 − s0) < eˆ. In the case that h02 ≤ eˆ it must
be that s′ = s0 since increasing investment after the tax increase can only strictly
decrease the worker’s lifetime earnings. Finally, consider the case where h1(1−s0) < eˆ
and h02 > eˆ. Then the first order condition
(1− τ) = θasθ−1
(
1− τˆ
1 + r
)
, (2.4)
holds at s = s0 and τˆ = τˆ 0, which implies
s0 =
[
(1− τˆ 0)θa
(1− τ)(1 + r)
] 1
1−θ
.
If (2.4) also holds at s = s′ and τˆ = τˆ ′ > τˆ 0, then s′ < s0. If (2.4) doesn’t hold after
the tax change, then it must be that h′2 ≤ eˆ < h02, which implies s′ < s0. .
In this section I have presented two highly stylized models in which an increase
in the Social Security taxable earnings cap depresses either labor or human capital
investment for workers with sufficiently high earnings. An open question is whether
the general equilibrium impact of these reforms will be quantitatively important in
a richer model with more detailed tax schemes, heterogeneous agents, a life-cycle
with several periods, and simultaneous labor-leisure-investment decisions for workers.
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Another open question is exactly who will gain and lose from such reforms, and whose
responses will be the most significant. Section 2.3 lays out a model which is capable of
answering these questions. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 calibrate the benchmark equilibrium
of the model to the US and analyze the impact of specific policy changes to the
earnings cap and the old age benefit formula.
2.3 The Model Economy
2.3.1 Demographics and Endowments
I model an overlapping generations economy in discrete time. Every period a unit
mass of individuals are born, each living J periods. At birth individuals are endowed
with initial human capital h1 and a learning ability a which determines their skill
in accumulating new human capital. Initial endowments are heterogeneous across
individuals.
Individuals are also endowed with a unit of time in each period. Time can be
split between three activities: production, n, investing, s, and leisure, 1− n− s. The
theoretical distinction between investing and production is that only time spent pro-
ducing contributes to output; time spent investing is useful only to the extent that it
contributes to future human capital. All individuals exogenously retire JSS periods
after they are born, meaning they must set leisure equal to one at ages j = JSS, ..., J .
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2.3.2 Preferences
There is a single consumption good, c. Individuals have preferences over con-
sumption and leisure given by the utility function
J∑
j=1
βj−1u(cj, 1− nj − sj).
Utility from leisure only depends on 1 − n − s, and not the mix of non-leisure time
spent investing or producing.
2.3.3 Human Capital Accumulation
Human capital evolves over a worker’s life according to a Ben-Porath technology:
hj+1 = (1− δh)hj + ahφj sθj .
A worker’s human capital in period j + 1 is the sum of her undepreciated human
capital from the beginning of period j and human capital produced in period j. δh
is the depreciation rate of existing human capital. Newly produced human capital in
period j depends on the worker’s learning ability a, her existing human capital hj,
and the amount of time she spends investing in period j, sj. The parameters φ < 1
and θ < 1 determine the elasticity of newly produced human capital with respect to
existing human capital and investment time, respectively.
2.3.4 Technology
Output is produced by a representative firm that operates a constant returns to
scale technology:
Y = F (K,H) = AKαH1−α ,
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where K and H denote aggregate physical capital and human capital inputs. Total
factor productivity A is assumed to be constant over time. Physical capital depreci-
ates at rate δk. The firm rents physical capital and human capital from individuals
in competitive markets.
2.3.5 Income Taxes
The government levies an income tax modeled after the current US federal income
tax. I make use of an off-the-shelf tax function proposed and estimated by Guner
et al. (2014) using data from the US Internal Revenue Service:
t(y/y¯) = max{ η0 + η1 log(y/y¯) , 0 } ,
where y is the before-tax income of the worker, y¯ is the average before tax income in
the economy, and t(y/y¯) is the average tax rate paid by the worker. The total income
tax liability is given by
T (y/y¯) = t(y/y¯)y .
I use the estimates they obtain from their entire US sample: η0 = .099 and η1 = .035.
2.3.6 Social Security
In the benchmark economy the government operates a pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem modeled after the current US Social Security system. The pension system taxes
the earnings of workers up to a capped amount eˆ at a flat rate τSS; earnings beyond
eˆ are not taxed. The pension system also delivers benefits to retired workers which
are a function of the workers’ average lifetime earnings at the point of retirement.
Specifically, workers begin period 1 with zero average earnings. A worker who began
period j with average earnings e¯, and who received earnings e during period j, begins
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period j + 1 with average earnings
e¯′ =
je¯+ min{e, eˆ}
j + 1
.
Note that earnings beyond the earnings tax cap eˆ do not contribute to a worker’s
average earnings. Retired workers receive a benefit b(e¯JSS) in each period of retirement
based on their average earnings at the time they retired.
2.3.7 The Government Dudget Constraint
The government raises revenue from two sources: income taxes and the Social
Security payroll tax. Government expenditures are the sum of expenditures on old
age Social Security benefits and government consumption, G. In the benchmark
economy government consumption is set so that the government’s budget is balanced
in each period.
2.3.8 The Decision Problem of an Individual
Individuals in the beginning of a period are heterogeneous in five dimensions, sum-
marized by an age j and a state vector x = (k, h, e¯, a), where k denotes the quantity
of physical assets owned by the individual, h denotes human capital owned by the
individual, e¯ denotes the average earnings of the individual prior to period j, and a
denotes the learning ability the individual was endowed with at birth. The distribu-
tion over states x at each age j is given by the function Λj(x). All individuals are
born in period 1 with zero assets and zero average earnings, so Λ1(x) is effectively a
bivariate distribution over (h1, a).
Given her state, an individual who is of working age decides how to split her pe-
riod time endowment between production n, human capital investment s, and leisure
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1−n−s. If j ≥ JSS the individual is retired and sets leisure equal to one. Individuals
also decide on a quantity of physical assets to hold next period k′ and how much to
consume this period c.
The individual problem is solved recursively. The value function of a working age
individual (j < JSS) is given by:
Vj(x) = max
c,k′,n,s
u(c , 1− n− s) + βVj+1(x′) (2.5)
s.t. (1 + τ c)c+ k′ = k(1 + r) + whn− τSS min{whn, eˆ} ; (2.6)
h′ = (1− δh)h+ ahφsθ ; (2.7)
e¯′ =
je¯+ min{whn, eˆ}
j + 1
; (2.8)
k′ ≥ k ; (2.9)
n, s ≥ 0; n+ s ≤ 1. (2.10)
Equation (2.6) is the period budget constraint facing the worker, where r is the risk
free interest rate that physical capital receives, w is the wage rate paid to a unit of
human capital, and whn is the worker’s pretax earnings. Equations (2.7) and (2.8)
govern the evolution of human capital and the average earnings of the individual from
period j to period j + 1, and equation (2.9) is a constraint on the borrowing of an
individual.
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Workers who are retired (j ≥ JSS) cannot work, and so face a simpler decision
problem:
Vj(x) = max
c,k′
uj(c , 1) + βVj+1(x
′) (2.11)
s.t. (1 + τ c)c+ k′ = k(1 + r) + b(e¯) ; (2.12)
e¯′ = e¯ ; (2.13)
k′ ≥ k . (2.14)
Equation (2.12) is the period budget constriant facing a retiree, where b(e¯) is the
benefit paid to the retiree based on her average lifetime earnings when she retired.
2.3.9 Stationary Equilibrium
This paper focuses on the long run equilibrium effects of reforms to the earnings
cap and benefit rule of the US Social Security system. The benchmark economy
and the reform economies are all particular parametrizations of the general model
economy described in Sections 2.3.1-2.3.8. I will now define a stationary equilibrium
for the general model economy.
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium for the closed economy is a collection of indi-
vidual decisions {cj(x), k′j(x), nj(x), sj(x)} for each age j and state x, aggregate vari-
ables {K,H}, factor prices {r, w}, government policy variables {τSS, τ c, b, eˆ}, and
measure of individuals Λ(x) that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Given factor prices, individuals’ decisions solve the corresponding optimization
problems defined in Section 2.3.8;
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2. Factor prices are determined competitively:
r = F1(K,H)− δk ,
w = F2(K,H) ;
3. Labor and capital markets clear:
H =
J∑
j=1
∫
hnj(x)Λj(dx) ,
K =
J∑
j=1
∫
kΛj(dx) ;
4. The output market clears:
G+ C +K = F (K,H) +K(1− δk)
5. The government’s budget is balanced:
G+
J∑
j=JSS
∫
b(e¯)Λj(dx) = τ
SS
JSS−1∑
j=1
∫
min{whnj(x), eˆ}Λj(dx)
+
J∑
j=1
∫
T (whnj(x)/Y )Λj(dx) ,
where Y = F (K,H) is the mean income in the economy.
6. The age vector of distributions (Λj(x)) is stationary: For any age-state pair
(j, x = (k, h, e¯, a)), define the law of motion for x′ = (k′, h′, e¯′, a′) by
k′ = k′j(x),
h′ = (1− δh)h+ ahφsj(x)θ,
e¯′ =

je¯+min{whnj(x),eˆ}
j+1
, if j < JSS
e¯ if j ≥ JSS,
a′ = a .
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Then (Λj(x)) is stationary if, for all (j + 1, x
′),
Λj+1(x
′) =
∫
1(x′=y′)Λj(dy) .
2.4 Calibration of the Benchmark Economy
This section discusses the calibration of the benchmark economy. First, I explain
how I set model parameters which are not part of the Social Security policy. I then
explain how I set the parameters which determine the benchmark Social Security
policy.
2.4.1 Parameters Not Related to the Social Security Program
Period and life-cycle length Individuals in the model are born 23 year old
adults. I assume that all individuals die at age 80. Due to large computational re-
quirements I set the number of periods in the model J = 12, implying that a model
period corresponds to 58/12 ≈ 5 years. I set JSS = 9, implying that all individuals
retire at age 62-67.
Technology and prices The elasticity of the aggregate production function
with respect to capital is set to α = .33 to match capital’s long run income share in
the US economy. The annual interest rate is set to .04, and the annual depreciation
rate of physical capital is set to .0711 to generate an annual capital to output ratio
of 3. This implies an annual rental rate of capital equal to .0711 + .04 = .1111,
which translates to a period rental rate of capital equal to R = 1.158/12 = 1.6640.
The corresponding period depreciation rate of physical capital is δk = .2993, and the
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period interest rate is .3647. The wage rate is determined in equilibrium according to
w = F2(K,H) = (1− α)(K/H)−α , (2.15)
R = F1(K,H) = α(K/H)
α−1 , (2.16)
=⇒ w = (1− α)α α1−αR αα−1 = .4726 . (2.17)
The parameters governing preferences and human capital are set so that equation
(2.15) holds, which closes the economy.
Preferences and human capital The remaining parameters governing indi-
vidual preferences and human capital accumulation are set to replicate life-cycle mo-
ments for annual earnings, hourly wages, and hours worked in the US. For an extensive
discussion of this calibration procedure, see Blandin (2015).
The distribution over initial human capital and learning abilities Λ1(h1, a) is as-
sumed to be log Normal. This leaves five parameters to calibrate: the means of
(h1, a), (µh, µa); the variances of (h1, a), (σh, σa); and the correlation between h1 and
a, ρh,a.
The period utility function u is assumed to take the form
u(c, 1− n− s) = log(c) + ψ (1− n− s)
1−γ
1− γ .
The parameter γ determines the Frisch elasticity of non-leisure time. Specifically
given a value of non-leisure time n+ s the Frisch elasticity is [1− (n+ s)]/[(n+ s)γ].
I follow Guvenen et al. (2014) in targeting the Frisch elasticity of the average hours
worked in the economy. Since average hours worked in the model are 43% of the time
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endowment, I set γ = 2 to correspond with an average Frisch elasticity of non-leisure
time of about 0.6.
The endowment parameters (µh, µa, σh, σa, ρh,a), the human capital depreciation
rate δh, the leisure parameter ψ, and the discount rate β are jointly targeted to
replicate seven moments in the data, and to ensure equation (2.15) holds. The data
moments are: the initial and peak values of mean earnings over the life-cycle, the
initial and peak values of the variance of log earnings over the life-cycle, the average
life-cycle variance of log earnings, the average hours worked over the life-cycle 4 , and
the decline in hourly wages over the final period of the life-cycle.
To construct life-cycle profiles for earnings, wages, and hours I use data from the
1968-2013 family-level files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I restrict
my sample to observations of heads of households between 23-65 years of age who
report working at least 500 hours in a given year and whose labor earnings were
between $5,000 and $1 million in 2009 dollars. 5 These qualifications result in a
sample of 25, 245 individuals and 164, 553 year-individual observations.
I restrict ages on the low end in an attempt to focus on “working age” individuals.
This restriction does not imply that I ignore early-life human capital accumulation.
Rather, I simply capture the result of this early accumulation in a reduced form man-
4Hours worked in the data are assumed to correspond to the sum of time spent producing and
time spent investing. This is equivalent to assuming all investment takes place on the job, which is
the standard assumption in the Ben-Porath literature.
5The sources of labor income used were “wages and salary”, “commission”, “overtime”, “profes-
sional practice income”, “tips”, “additional income”, and “all other labor income”. The minimum
hours and earnings thresholds are designed to exclude individuals who were full time students or
who experienced a long term unemployment spell. I throw out extremely high earners because these
few outliers occasionally alter the measured moments.
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ner, through the initial distribution of human capital and ability endowments. In
fact, since these initial endowments are the only source of heterogeneity in the model,
early human capital accumulation plays a crucial role in my analysis.
I now discuss how the age profiles used to set model parameters are generated.
The human capital model laid out in Section 2.3 is not able to replicate every aspect
of time variation contained in the data, so I use a statistical model to extract the
sources of variation the model model is designed to address. Following the approach
of Huggett et al. (2011), I first group the data into 5-year centered age bins. I then
assume that the statistics of interest are governed by the following fixed effects model:
stata,t,c = xa + xt + xc + a,t,c (2.18)
where xa, xt, xc denote age, year, and birth cohort fixed effects, respectively, and
a,t,c is an error term. Since c ≡ t−a, there is a well-known multicollinearity problem
involved with estimating this model. I assume that xc = 0 ∀c (a “year-effects” view).
2.4.2 Social Security Parameters
Two tax parameters and a benefit formula determine the Social Security policy.
The parameters are the payroll tax τSS and the tax cap eˆ. τSS is set to 10.6% to
correspond to the Social Security payroll tax rate in the US. eˆ is set to be consistent
with the fact that 10.2% of workers in my PSID sample under the age of 65 have
earnings which exceed the cap.
The old age Social Security benefit in the US is a function of a worker’s average
indexed monthly earnings (AIME). To compute a worker’s AIME, the government
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first gathers the reported earnings of that worker for every year of his life. The 35
years with the highest earnings are then averaged together and divided by 12 (if the
worker has less than 35 years with positive reported earnings, zeros are inserted for
the remaining years). Only earnings below the taxable earnings cap are used to com-
pute this average.
An individual’s monthly old age benefit is determined once and for all based off
his AIME at the time the worker registers for Social Security benefits. In 2013, the
benefit was 90% of the first $791 of his AIME, 32% of the next $4,768, and 15%
beyond this point (note that benefits have a cap because only earnings below the tax
cap are used to compute the AIME). The bendpoints are set in the model so that
the ratio of the bendpoint to average earnings in the model is the same as the actual
ratio of the bendpoint to average earnings in my 2013 PSID sample.
The values of the parameters set in this section are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.5 The Impact of Reforming Social Security
This section details the steady state outcomes of four reforms of the Social Secu-
rity earnings cap. Section 2.5.1 discusses the impact of eliminating the earnings cap
and using the additional revenue to reduce the Social Security funding deficit. Next
I discuss two reforms which eliminate the earnings cap but do not change the Social
Security funding deficit. In Section 2.5.2 the additional revenue from eliminating the
cap is offset by lower revenue from lowering the payroll tax rate; in Section 2.5.3 the
additional revenue from eliminating the cap is used to fund lump sum increases in
old age benefits for all retirees. Finally, Section 2.5.4 lowers the earnings cap to the
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters.
Parameter Description Value
Production α Weight on K in production function .33
δk Annual depreciation rate of capital .0711
Preferences β Annual discount rate .946
ψ Utility of leisure .685
γ Frisch elasticity of non-leisure time 2
Human Capital (µh, µa) Mean of log (h1, a) (5.8,1.6)
(σh, σa) Variance of log (h1, a) (.56,.35)
ρh,a Correlation of log (h1, a) .95
δh Depreciation rate of human capital .006
second bendpoint level (see Section 2.4.2), and increases the payroll tax rate so that
the Social Security funding deficit is unchanged.
Under the first three reforms, which eliminate the earnings cap, the maximum
earnings which count towards the worker’s average earnings e¯ are unchanged from
the baseline economy. That is, although high earners now pay the payroll tax on all
their earnings, earnings above the baseline earnings cap do not increase the old age
benefits of those workers. This aspect of reform is in line with the Congressional bills
referenced in the introduction, which call for replacement rates above the current cap
which are either zero or close to zero.
To asses the role of endogenous human capital in my results, I also conduct Re-
forms 1-4 in a model where human capital is exogenous. To do this, I first construct a
benchmark exogenous human capital model by assuming that workers face the same
individual human capital profiles generated by the benchmark endogenous human
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capital model, and that these human capital profiles are fixed (i.e. there is no pro-
ductive role for investment in this exogenous human capital model). I then analyze
the impact of Reforms 1-4 on this exogenous human capital model, assuming that the
human capital profiles of workers do not change across policy regimes.
2.5.1 Reform 1: Eliminating the Earnings Cap and Reducing the Social Security
Funding Deficit
Table 2.2: Steady State Impact of Reforms on Economic Aggregates.
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4
Endog. Exog. Endog. Exog. Endog. Exog. Endog. Exog.
Consumption -2.9% -1.3% -1.8% -0.8% -2.3% -1.0% +0.5% +0.3%
Output -2.1% -1.2% -2.2% -1.2% -3.1% -1.7% +1.3% +1.0%
Physical Capital -1.3% -0.9% -1.9% -1.2% -3.4% -2.4% +2.7% +1.8%
Human Capital -2.5% -1.2% -2.3% -1.0% -3.0% -1.4% +0.7% +.4%
Hours Worked -1.2% -1.0% -1.0% -0.8% -1.6% -1.3% +1.0% +1.0%
Human Capital Investment -5.1% NA -4.5% NA -5.9% NA -0.5% NA
Reform 1 sets the Social Security earnings cap eˆ = ∞, and assumes additional
payroll tax revenue is spent on government consumption. This can be thought of as
using the additional payroll tax revenue to improve the solvency of the Social Security
system. Table 2.2 summarizes the aggregate impact of this reform. Aggregate con-
sumption falls by 2.9%, while aggregate output falls by 2.1%. Output is lower both
because savings fall by 1.3% (in response to lower after-tax income for high earners),
and because the supply of human capital falls by 2.5% (see Section 2.2). The decline
in the supply of human capital is due to a 1.2% decline in hours worked and to a
5.1% decline in human capital investment. Table 2.2 also makes clear that the role
of endogenous human capital is first order: the change in economic aggregates
72
is roughly half as large when I do not allow the human capital profiles of workers to
change across policy regimes.
Much of the aggregate effects of this reform can be attributed to a small group of
workers with high initial human capital and high ability. Table 2.3 asks what frac-
tion of the change in aggregate consumption, phsyical capital, and human capital is
attributable to responses by workers who were born with initial human capital and
learning ability both in the top 10% of the population. 64% of the decline in aggregate
consumption, 47% of the decline in the supply of human capital, and 130% of the
decline in the supply of phsyical capital is accounted for by these high-endowment
workers.
Table 2.4 summarizes aggregate changes in government revenue and expenditures
as a result of Reform 1. While revenue from payroll taxes increases by 11.8%, revenue
from the federal income tax falls by 2.9%. As a result, total revenue increases by only
1.2%. This echoes recent findings by Guner et al. (2015) and Badel and Huggett
(2014), which argue that the scope for raising additional revenue by increasing taxes
on top earners is limited.
Finally, Table 2.5 analyzes the welfare implications of Reform 1. Workers bene-
fit from higher wages and a lower interest rate, but some workers face substantially
higher tax liabilities. Overall, 73% of workers are better off after the reform, while
32% are worse off. Among workers who were made worse off by the reform, average
utility was 2.4% lower in CE terms. Among workers who benefited from the reform
the expected welfare gain was an order of magnitude smaller, 0.2% in CE terms. The
expected welfare increase is small for two reasons. First, the reform only increases
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wages by 0.1% and lowers the interest rate by about one basis point. Second, the
additional revenue from eliminating the earnings cap is spent on government con-
sumption, which does not enter into the utility function of workers. Reforms 2 and
3, by contrast, use the additional revenue from eliminating the earnings cap to lower
tax rates and raise old age benefits, respectively.
2.5.2 Reform 2: Eliminating the Earnings Cap and Reducing the Payroll Rax Rate
Table 2.3: Share of Aggregate Changes Attributable to High-Endowment Workers.
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4
Consumption 64% 92% 79% 33%
Physical Capital 130% 180% 83% 86%
Human Capital 47% 49% 38% 3%
Reform 2 sets the Social Security earnings cap eˆ = ∞, and lowers the payroll
tax rate τSS so that the Social Security funding deficit (total revenue collected from
payroll taxes minus total expenditures on old age benefits) is unchanged. The deficit-
balancing payroll tax rate is 9.4%, down from 10.6% in the baseline economy.
Table 2.2 shows that the effects on aggregate output (-2.2%), physical capital
(-1.9%), and human capital (-2.3%) are similar between Reforms 1 and 2. This is
because the change in marginal tax rates for high earners is roughly the same across
both reforms, and these individuals drive the changes in economic aggregates (see
Table 2.3).
However, consumption only falls by 1.8% under Reform 2, relative to 2.9% under
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Reform 1, because workers with earnings below the original earnings cap receive a
tax decrease. This substantially improves the welfare of workers relative to Reform 1.
Specifically, 78% of workers benefit from Reform 2, with an average utility increase
of 1.6% in CE terms among these workers. Alternatively, 22% of workers are worse
off under the reform, with an average loss of 2.1% among these workers.
While welfare is higher under Reform 2 than Reform 1, federal revenue is substan-
tially lower because the payroll tax rate is reduced. Total federal revenues are 2.0%
lower under Reform 2 relative to the baseline model, and 3.1% lower under Reform 2
relative to Reform 1.
2.5.3 Reform 3: Eliminating the Earnings Cap and Increasing Old Age Benefits
Table 2.4: Steady State Impact of Reforms on Government Revenues and Expendi-
tures.
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4
Payroll tax revenue +11.8% -0.5% +11.0% -12.7%
Income tax revenue -2.9% -2.5% -4.5% +2.8%
Total tax revenue +1.2% -2.0% -0.2% -1.5%
Old age benefit expenditures -0.1% -0.3% +6.7% -7.3%
Reform 3 sets the Social Security earnings cap eˆ = ∞, and increases old age
benefits for all retirees lump sum, so that the Social Security funding deficit (total
revenue collected from payroll taxes minus total expenditures on old age benefits) is
unchanged. The deficit-balancing lump sum benefit increase is 5.3% of the maximum
possible Social Security benefit.
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As Table 2.2 shows, Reform 3 generates the largest reductions in aggregate out-
put, physical capital, and human capital among all the reforms I consider, between
3.0− 3.4%. The reason is that relative to Reform 1 low earners work less, in response
to a lump sum increase in their old age benefits; and relative to Reform 2 high earners
experience an even larger increase in marginal tax rates, since the payroll tax rate is
unchanged.
Reform 3 also has less positive impacts on welfare relative to Reform 2. While 63%
of workers benefit from the reform, workers who benefit experience a much smaller
average utility increase of 0.4% in CE terms. Workers who are worse off experience
an average utility decrease of 2.3%. Fewer workers benefit, and those who do tend to
benefit by less, relative to Reform 2 for two reasons. First, physical capital falls by
more than human capital, so workers face lower wages and higher interest rates, both
of which lower the present value of their lifetime earnings. Second, since the supply of
human capital falls by more under Reform 3 than under Reform 2, the revenue base
for payroll taxes falls by more, which limits the size of the lump sum benefit increase
that leaves the Social Security funding deficit unchanged.
2.5.4 Reform 4: Reducing the Earnings Cap
Table 2.5: Steady State Impact of Reforms on Welfare of Newborn Workers.
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4
Share of workers benefiting from reform .73 .78 .63 .98
Welfare gain (%), conditional on benefiting +0.1% +1.6% +0.4% +1.2%
Welfare loss (%), conditional on losing -2.4% -2.1% -2.3% -0.1%
Average welfare change (%) -0.7% +0.9% -0.6% +1.2%
In contrast to Reforms 1-3, which raised the earnings cap to infinity, Reform 4
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lowers the earnings cap to the second bendpoint of the old age benefit formula. I
also raise the payroll tax rate from 10.6% to 11.4% so that the Social Security deficit
is unchanged. The new earnings cap is 59% of the original earnings cap. While this
level is somewhat arbitrary, it is interesting for a few reasons. First, when the average
indexed monthly earnings (AIME) of a worker cross the second bendpoint threshold,
the replacement rates of old age benefits drops from 32% to 15%—that is, for workers
who retire with an AIME beyond the second bendpoint, the marginal increase in ben-
efits from a marginal increase in earnings is close to zero. Additionally, several OECD
countries have pension systems funded by a proportional tax up to a cap (see OECD
(2013)), and the lowest ratio of this cap to average earnings is Switzerland at 96% of
average earnings. Since the second bendpoint is set to 90% of the average earnings in
the baseline economy, the exercise can be thought of as replacing the earnings cap-
to-average-earnings ratio in the US with a ratio close to the lowest ratio in the OECD.
Table 2.2 shows that aggregate output increases by 1.3%, aggregate physical cap-
ital by 2.7%, and aggregate human capital by 0.7%. The large increase in physical
capital increases wages by 0.5% and lowers the interest rate by 10 basis points. The
increase in output raises revenues from the federal income tax by 2.8%. Different
from Reforms 1-3, the change in economic aggregates are not primarily driven by
workers with initial endowments of human capital and learning ability in the top 10%
of the population: only 33% of the increase in aggregate consumption, and 3% of the
increase in aggregate earnings, are attributable to these high-endowment workers.
Most interestingly, after Reform 4 welfare increases for 95% of workers, and across
all workers average welfare increases by 1.2% in CE terms. Workers experience wel-
fare improvements for several reasons. First, many workers experience a decrease in
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marginal and average tax rates: in a given period the number of workers with earn-
ings above the earnings cap increases from 10% in the baseline model to 29% after
the reform, and the fraction of workers who earn above the earnings cap at some
point in their life increases from 27% in the baseline model to 56% after the reform.
Second, higher wages and lower interest rates increase welfare for all workers. Third,
the increase in output means that the required increase in the payroll tax rate to
leave the Social Security funding deficit unchanged is small.
One note of caution is important for interpreting these results. The model is
deterministic, and therefore there is no way for Social Security to provide welfare-
improving insurance against random shocks to earnings or wages which might occur
over the life-cycle of workers. While it would be interesting to extend this model to a
stochastic setting, it is unlikely that doing so would overturn any of my key results.
Huggett et al. (2011) use a Ben-Porath model to argue that 2/3 of the variance in
lifetime incomes are due to initial human capital and ability differences at age 23,
which is when the workers in my model are born. Additionally, workers can partially
insure against income shocks by saving, which limits the insurance value of Social
Security. Finally, another source of uncertainty which this model abstracts from is
uncertainty over lifespans. However, Hong and R´ıos-Rull (2007) argue that welfare-
enhancing aspect of Social Security as an annuity is small relative to distortions to
the intertemporal savings margin of workers, particularly in economies where life-
insurance markets exist.
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2.6 Conclusion
Old age Social Security benefits in the US are funded by a 10.6% payroll tax up
to a cap, currently set at $118,500. Despite calls from politicians and policy circles
to eliminate the cap on taxable earnings, there has been little work examining the
likely outcomes of such a policy change. I use a life-cycle model with heterogeneous
individuals to investigate the aggregate and distributional steady state impacts of
several policy changes the earnings cap. Three crucial features of my model are a
federal income tax and social security program modeled after existing US policies; a
labor-leisure decision by workers; and endogenous human capital profiles which de-
pend on investment decisions by workers.
I find: (1) Eliminating the earnings cap generates large reductions in aggregate
output and consumption, between 2.1-3.1%. (2) The role of endogenous human cap-
ital is first order: when I do not allow the life-cycle human capital profiles of workers
to adjust across policy regimes, the change in economic aggregates is roughly cut in
half. (3) While eliminating the earnings cap increases revenues from the payroll tax
by 12%, the decline in output lowers other federal tax revenues, so that total federal
tax revenues never increase by more than 1.2%. (4) Eliminating the earnings cap
produces modest welfare gains for about 2/3 of workers, while about 1/3 of workers
experience welfare losses, which are typically large. (5) Reducing the earnings cap
to a level near the mean of earnings increases aggregate output by 1.3%, and also
increases welfare for the vast majority of workers.
There are many aspects of reality that the current project abstracts from, which I
leave to future work. There is no welfare-enhancing insurance role for Social Security
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since the model is deterministic; introducing uncertainty in wages, human capital
stocks, or lifespans could alter the impact on welfare of social security reforms. I
also assume that demographics do not vary over time. Allowing population growth
rates and life-spans to change over time could provide important insights into the
sustainability of Social Security and the revenue impact of government reforms.
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Chapter 3
EQUILIBRIUM WITH MUTUAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ECONOMIES WITH
ADVERSE SELECTION
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, social insurance is defined to be the centralized provision of some
form of insurance. A question is, why have social insurance? Adverse selection is
often used as justification for social insurance, because many claim that adverse se-
lection can lead to the inefficient provision of insurance by decentralized mechanisms.
We find that if mutual organizations are feasible and permitted, there is no failure
of decentralized arrangements in providing insurance or, for that matter, in dealing
with the Akerlof (1970) used-car “lemons” environment or with the Spence (1973)
job market signaling environment. If mutual insurance organizations are permitted,
Adam Smith’s invisible hand works. There are no market failures due to adverse
selection in providing insurance.
We modify the definition of equilibrium used by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) in
essentially one respect. We permit the agents who select insurance arrangements to
select mutual arrangements. A mutual arrangement is a set of contracts which specify
payments contingent on both individual experiences and the aggregate experience of
all contract holders. In addition, the set of contracts must be such that the organiza-
tion profits are not negative. As in Boyd et al. (1988), there are mutual organizations,
and a core-related equilibrium concept is developed and used. But unlike this earlier
approach, the new definition of equilibrium is simpler and more general. Existence,
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uniqueness (in the types’ utility outcomes), and optimality are established for an ar-
bitrary finite number of types of individuals. The earlier Boyd-Prescott equilibrium
was defined only for two types. Attempts by us and others to generalize to more than
two types have failed.
With the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium definition, at the first stage nonmu-
tual insurance contracts are selected. At the second stage, individuals choose their
optimal contract from the set of offered contracts, or choose not to insure. In our
definition, at the first stage mutual insurance contracts are selected. At the second
stage, individuals pick their mutual arrangement optimally given the choices of oth-
ers. Thus, the second stage is a Nash equilibrium.
We say that a mutual arrangement is blocked if there exists an alternative mutual
arrangement for which a subset of types can make themselves better off using only
their own resources. An equilibrium is defined to be an unblocked mutual arrange-
ment. With our setup, if and only if an equilibrium mutual arrangement is chosen
at stage 1, no agent can offer an alternative mutual arrangement that is profitable,
given what will happen in the second stage.
We abstract from a number of features of reality that are important in the provi-
sion of insurance. In our examples, no costs are associated with operating an insurance
company, whereas in fact operating an insurance company entails large costs. Evi-
dence that these costs are large is that the gross output share of the U.S. insurance
carriers and related activities sector reported in the U.S. National Accounts was 5
percent of GNP in 2012. Associated with the operation of an insurance business are
record-keeping costs, monitoring costs needed to mitigate the moral hazard problems
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associated with insurance contracts, and asset-managing costs as premiums are re-
ceived prior to claims being paid. If there were a market failure, when evaluating
social insurance, these costs would have to be carefully quantified and incorporated
into the analysis in addition to the costs that are specific to social insurance. But
there is no need to quantify all these costs because the decentralized outcome is Pareto
efficient.
3.2 The Relationship to Other Equilibrium Concepts
We use Debreu (1954) definition of an economy. In so doing, we follow Cornet,
who has been a leading contributor to the development of the theory of value (see,
e.g., Cornet (1988)). Debreu’s definition of an economy requires the specification of
a commodity space. The commodity space is a linear topological space. There also
is a set of individuals with preference orderings on subsets of the commodity space
and a set of technologies, which are subsets of the commodity space. Consequently,
feasibility and Pareto optimality are well defined. In addition, the economic statis-
tics of the national income accounts can be calculated and welfare analysis carried out.
An assumption is that the preference orderings of individuals can be characterized
by the expected value of utility functions, which are continuous real-valued functions
on the underlying consumption set. As in Prescott and Townsend (1984), the ele-
ments of the commodity space are signed measures on the Borel sigma-algebra of the
underlying consumption set. The consumption sets are sets of probability measures
in this space.
Equilibrium is not a Debreu valuation equilibrium as it is in the Prescott and
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Townsend (1984) private information economies, where households and those who
pick the commodity vector in the technology sets take prices as given. Instead, as
part of the definition of equilibrium, the blocking concept in Edgeworth (1881) theory
of the core is used. But groups do not block. Rather, an initial mutual organization
is blocked if an active agent writes a charter for a new mutual organization which
makes a subset of individuals better off while preserving resource and incentive feasi-
bility. This is similar to competition among insurance firms in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), except that the choice is a mutual arrangement and not an insurance contract.
Using our equilibrium definition, if mutual organizations are prohibited and nonmu-
tual companies permitted, all the findings of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) hold. In
their classic environment, for example, no transfers occur between individual types
in equilibrium, and any equilibrium allocation must be the minimum separating al-
location.
Given expected utility maximization, the utility function of each individual type
is linear, and the set of incentive-compatible allocations is a convex affine cone. The
intersection of the resource constraint set and the incentive-compatible allocation set
is a convex subset with dimension one less than the number of types.
Each person either selects the mutual organization that is best given the choices of
other people or chooses not to insure. Thus, the second stage is a Nash equilibrium.
The economy is large with an atomistic measure of each of the finite number of types
of individuals. Type is private information.
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3.3 The Formal Analysis
The economies are large with a finite number of individual types i ∈ I. The mea-
sures of type i are λi. The underlying consumption set is C, a closed and bounded
subset of Rn. The commodity space is the space L of signed measures on the Borel
sigma-algebra of C.
Each individual’s consumption possibilities set is X ⊂ L, the set of probability
measures on the Borel sigma-algebra of C. Preferences of a type i are ordered by the
expected value of a continuous function vi:
ui(x) =
∫
vi(c)x(dc).
An allocation is an n-tuple {xi}i∈I . The Incentive Compatibility constraints (IC)
are
ui(x
i) ≥ ui(xj) ∀i, j ∈ I. (3.1)
Type i must weakly prefer xi to xj.
The single Resource Constraint (RC) has the form
I∑
i=1
λi(ri(x
i)− pii) ≤ 0, (3.2)
where the functions ri : X → R are linear and the pii are parameters. In the Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance case the resource constraint is the condition that
a mutual insurance organization cannot distribute more in claims than it takes in as
premiums. In the Spence (1973) signaling environment, it is the condition that wage
payments to members of a mutual organization cannot exceed the value of production
of that organization.
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An allocation is feasible if it satisfies the incentive constraints, (3.1), and the re-
source constraint, (3.2). An allocation x is a Pareto optimum if for no other feasible
allocation y, ui(y
i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i with strict inequality for at least one i.
3.3.1 Working in the Utility Space
We transform the problem into the utility space as the proofs of existence and
optimality of unblocked mutual arrangements are carried out in this space.
Associated with each allocation x is a utility vector u(x) = {ui(xi)}i∈I . The set
of utility vectors that satisfy the incentive constraints is denoted by IC. This set is
a convex affine cone. The set of allocations that yield a given point in IC is convex.
The mapping from utility vectors in the IC set to allocations that we use is denoted
by x(u). If the inverse image of u(x) is not a point, then the mean allocation of
all allocations that yield utility vector is the value of the function x(u). This mean
allocation is in the set of allocations that yield u, because the inverse image of the
function u(x) is a convex set.
The aggregate net transfer made by type i is
ti(u) = λi(ri(x
i(u)− pii). (3.3)
The resource constraint is
I∑
i=1
ti(u) = 0. (3.4)
The set of utility vectors that satisfy this constraint is a hyper-plane with dimension
one less than the cardinality of I.
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Definition 2 A feasible utility vector u is blocked by feasible u′ if, for the set of types
that do better under u′, denoted by B,
∑
i∈B
ti(u
′) ≥ 0.
3.3.2 Some Results
Result 4 The Pareto optimum utility set, denoted P , is a closed, convex subset of
the hyper-plane that satisfies (3.4).
Result 5 Any utility vector u which is not Pareto optimal is blocked by the set of
types I and some Pareto superior feasible utility vector.
Result 6 Any unblocked utility vector u is a Pareto optimum.
Result 7 Utility vector u ∈ P is blocked if and only if there is a u′ ∈ P that blocks
it.
Therefore, the problem is to establish the existence of an unblocked utility vector
u ∈ P .
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists and is unique in the utility space.
Proof Denote the Pareto utility set by P . Pick a direction in P . Moving in that
direction makes one set of types better off and the other set worse off. Thus a direc-
tion partitions the types into two sets. Moving in the given direction makes one set
of types better off and the compliment set of types worse off.
A point u in P and a direction define a line. The intersection of a line and P is a
line segment. Given a line segment in a subset in P , that subset can be partitioned
into line segments parallel to this line segment. Along any of these partitions, utilities
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and transfers vary linearly. A necessary condition for an unblocked utility point to
be on the line is that transfers by the benefiting group for the given direction min-
imizes the absolute value of the transfers by that group in that partition. The set
of all utility points that satisfy this property for some partition is a convex set with
dimensionality less than that of the subset. All unblocked utility points lie in that set.
Given that the dimensionality of P is finite, beginning with subset P by induction
a set of dimension zero can be found that contains the unblocked utility points, u∗.

Note that the allocation that yields u∗ may not be unique. If not unique, we select
the allocation that is the average of the set that yields this utility outcome. Given
the linearity of the mapping from feasible arrangements to utilities, the inverse image
of any point in the utility possibility set is a convex set. Thus, this average is a point
in the set.
3.4 Application to the Adverse Selection Insurance Environment
The environment has measures λi of people of type i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} = I. The same
symbol is used for both the cardinality of the set and the set itself. An individual’s
type is private information. A person has a random endowment subsequent to con-
tracting ej ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} = J . The probability of a type i having endowment ej is piij.
The underlying consumption space is C = {x ∈ RJ+ : xj ≤ c¯ ∀j}. The consump-
tion ceiling c¯ is sufficiently large that increasing it does not increase the set of feasible
allocations. This is possible because the resource constraint, necessary for feasibility,
88
is bounded. The commodity point is
x = {xj(dc)}j∈J .
The consumption possibility set X is a vector of J probability measures, and the
utility functions are
ui(x) =
∑
j∈J
piij
∫
v(c)xj(dc), ∀i ∈ I.
The function v : C → R is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave.
3.4.1 The Rothschild and Stiglitz Two-Type Adverse-Selection Environment
There are two types and two possible positive endowments: 0 < eb < eg. The
subscripts denote bad, b, and good, g. The two individual types are low-risk, L, and
high-risk, H. Thus,
piLb < piHb.
We normalize the population size to one so that
λH + λL = 1.
The average endowment for type i is
e¯i = piibeb + piigeg ∀i ∈ I.
Depending on the parameter values, the equilibrium will fall into one of two cate-
gories: equilibria with no transfers between types, or equilibria with positive transfers
from type L to type H individuals.
The unblocked utility vector is the one that maximizes type L utility on the utility
possibility frontier. If λL is sufficiently large, the set of Pareto optima is a point, with
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everyone consuming the average population endowment e¯(λL). This average is an
increasing function in λL.
For the unblocked contract, the probability measures for an L type conditional on
that individual endowment realization place all probability on a single point: cLb for
eLb and cLb for e
L
g . This follows from the assumed properties of the utility function
v. We denote the consumption of a high-risk individual, which is the same for both
possible endowments, by cH . Thus, each Pareto optimum is characterized by a triplet
of real numbers (cb, cg, cH). The utility functions in terms of these three variables are
denoted by UH(cH) = v(cH) and UL(cb, cg) = piLbv(cb) + piLgv(cg).
To find the Pareto set, we first find the utility-maximizing contract for type L
given an average transfer from type L individuals to type H individuals, T . These
transfers are constrained to the interval
T ∈ [0, (e¯L − e¯H)λH ].
The upper end of the interval results in the average consumption of the two types be-
ing equal. The transfer for which the utility of type L is maximal is the equilibrium T ∗.
We proceed in two steps. First, we consider the problem of maximizing the utility
of a type L given average transfer T . The value of the solution is denoted by uˆL(T ).
This program is
uˆL(T ) = max
cH ,cb,cg
UL(cb, cg)
subject to the following four constraints:
1. Type H consumption is feasible given T :
cH ≤ e¯H + TλL/λH ;
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2. Type L consumption is feasible given T :
piLbcb + piLgcg ≤ e¯L − T ;
3. Type H individuals prefer their own contract to the type L contract:
UH(cH , cH) ≥ UH(cb, cg) ;
4. Type L individuals prefer their own contract to the type H contract:
UL(cb, cg) ≥ UL(cH , cH).
To find the Pareto optimum utility sets, the utility of type L is maximized given
the utility level of type H, which is pinned down by T . This function is denoted by
uˆL(uH). The nature of this function depends on the fraction of low-risk types, λL.
If this fraction is sufficiently small, the curve is as depicted in Figure 3.1(a). The
equilibrium utility vector is denoted by u∗. At this point, no transfers between types
take place. The Pareto set, depicted in red in Figure 3.1, is the decreasing portion of
this concave function.
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Figure 3.1: uˆL(uH) in the Two-Type Rothschild and Stiglitz Environment for (a)
Small λL; and (b) Large λL.
The greater the population fraction of the low-risk people, the higher the inter-
section with the 45 degree line, where all consume the mean endowment independent
of type and individual endowment realization. For a sufficiently large λL, the Pareto
set is a point set with everyone getting utility v(e¯(λL)) with certainty.
3.4.2 Relation to the Rothschild and Stiglitz Equilibrium
Only for the fractions λL for which the slope of the curve is negative at u
sep as
in Figure 3.1(a), does the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium exist. In these cases,
the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium and ours are the same. But our equilibrium
always exists and is unique.
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3.4.3 The General Rothschild and Stiglitz Case
The equilibrium in the more general case can be found by solving the problem
of minimizing the l1 norm of the transfer vector over the set of Pareto optima. The
minimum exists given that it is a convex minimization problem with a compact con-
straint set and a continuous objective function. In some cases, the optimum will
have non-degenerate lotteries conditional on the endowment, namely when different
degrees of risk aversion can be exploited to separate the types.
3.5 Application to the Spence Signaling Environment
We turn now to the simple Spence (1973) signaling equilibrium, which does not re-
quire lotteries to convexify the economy. A point in the commodity space is x = (c, s)
where c is consumption and s is the signal and the commodity space is R2.
Types are denoted by i ∈ I = {1, 2}. The consumption set is X = {x ∈ R2+ : x ≤
xmax}. Individuals of type 2 are the high-productivity individuals (i.e. pi2 > pi1 > 0)
and have the lower disutility of signaling (0 < θ2 < θ1). The utility functions are
ui = c− θis ∀i ∈ I.
The xmax is sufficiently large that all resource feasible allocations are in this con-
sumption set. A sufficiently large cmax is pi2. A sufficiently large s
max is pi2/θ2.
Aggregate transfers from the high-productivity type to the low-productivity type are
t2(u) = pi2 − c2(u).
The equilibrium utility vector is u∗. Figure 3.2(a) specifies the set of utility allo-
cations that are incentive feasible. The set is a convex cone. Figure 3.2(b) specifies
the feasible set of allocations and (in red) the Pareto set. For this example, the line
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defined by the resource constraint being binding has a negative slope, which requires
the fraction of high-productivity types to be below a critical value. If it is not below
this critical value, the line has a weakly positive slope, and the Pareto set is a point
set with everyone consuming the population average productivity and having a zero
signal.
The interesting case is the one in which the Pareto set is a downward-sloping
line. Figure 3.2(c) specifies the sign of the transfers from the high-productivity to
low-productivity people along the Pareto set. The utility vector for the equilibrium
is the point u∗.
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Figure 3.2: The Utility Space in the Two-Type Spence Signaling Environment
Note: Displays (a) The Incentive Compatibility, IC, set; (b) The Pareto set, P ; (c)
Transfers along the Pareto set.
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3.5.1 Relation to Spence’s Valuation Equilibrium
Spence used a valuation equilibrium with externalities. The equilibrium depends
on the commodity space. The commodities were the set of signals permitted, S, and
the consumption good. Let c be the numeraire and ws the wage for labor of type s.
A Spence equilibrium requires that all individuals select signals that maximize their
utility given the prices and, for every s that was chosen by some type, the average
productivity of those who choose that s is equal to ws.
Any feasible allocation is an equilibrium for an appropriately selected S as was
shown in Prescott and Townsend (1981). For each signal, the associated wage is the
average productivity of people who choose that signal.
3.6 Conclusion
The equilibrium concept developed requires there be a single resource constraint
and that individuals maximize expected utility. This is an important class of en-
vironments that have received a great deal of attention in the economics literature.
Equilibrium concepts that are useful in some environments are not useful in others.
We see this equilibrium as expanding the set of environments for which there is a
useful equilibrium concept.
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APPENDIX A
THE HYBRID HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
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In this paper I analyze the life-cycle patterns for earnings, hourly wages, and
hours worked generated by a BP and LBD model, and compare these predictions to
data on US workers. An alternative approach to comparing these two models would
be to nest each model within a more general human capital function, and then ask
what parametrizations of this more general function are consistent with data on US
workers. This section lays out such a function and characterizes the optimal decisions
of workers when this function is present.
In Section 1.2.2 I laid out the BP version of the human capital function H:
H = ahφsθ ,
and the LBD version of H:
H = ahφnθ .
Recall that a is the learning ability of a worker, and h is the existing human capital of
a worker. The two versions of the human capital function accept different inputs: s is
human capital investment, and n is time spent producing by the worker. The theoret-
ical distinction between production and investment is that a worker is paid a wage w
for the time he spends producing, but is not compensated for time he spends investing.
Each of these versions can be nested by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function H which accepts two inputs two human capital formation, production and
investment:
H(α, ρ) = ahφ [αsρ + (1− α)nρ]θ/ρ . (A1)
Here, α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight placed on the investment input relative to the pro-
duction input, and 1
1−ρ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between investment and
production. The function in (A1) nests the BP human capital function when α = 1
101
and nests the LBD function when α = 0. Killingsworth (1982) discusses some im-
plications of a hybrid human capital function which is a special case of the one in (A1).
Figure A1: H(α) as a Function of Investment
Note: Displays values of newly-produced human capital H as a function
of the share of non-leisure time spent investing, s
s+n
. The total amount
of non-leisure time s + n is held fixed. The profiles for different val-
ues of α are displayed; all profiles are constructed imposing ρ → 0.
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s+n
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Figure A1 plots the value of H as a function of the share of non-leisure time
a worker spends investing, holding the total amount of non-leisure time fixed, and
setting ρ → 0 (i.e. the Cobb-Douglas case). The value of α places a ceiling on the
share of non-leisure time a worker will choose to spend investing in a given period.
Specifically, given α ∈ (0, 1), the fraction of time a worker spends investing will always
fall in the interval
s
s+ n
∈
0, 1(
1−α
α
) 1
1−ρ + 1
 . (A2)
Note that the right hand side of the interval is increasing in α since ρ < 1. The
reason, as Figure A1 demonstrates for several different values of α, is that H is only
increasing in s
s+n
over the interval in (A2). Therefore, if a worker chooses to spend
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a larger share of non-leisure time than in (A2), he could consume the same amount
of leisure, produce the same amount of human capital, and earn strictly more in the
current period by spending a larger share of his non-leisure time producing rather
than investing. In the limit as α → 0 (the LBD case) the interval in (A2) collapses
to the point 0, since investment is useless for producing human capital in this case.
The following first order conditions pin down the worker’s optimal decision:(
−∂uj
∂nj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Leisure)
=
(
λωhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Earning)
+ λ(
∂hj+1
∂nj
)[
J−j∑
k=1
R−kωnj+k(
∂hj+k
∂hj+1
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Learning by producing)
(A3)
= λ(
∂hj+1
∂sj
)[
J−j∑
k=1
R−kωnj+k(
∂hj+k
∂hj+1
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV(Learning by investing)
. (A4)
The above equations resemble the BP first order conditions in the sense that three
marginal values are equated: the value of leisure, the value of producing, and the value
of investing. As with the BP model, all else equal the marginal value of learning by
investing tends to fall as workers age because the number of periods during which
new human capital can be used is declining to zero. As a result, workers will typically
invest less as they age to satisfy the second equality.
Different from the BP conditions, but similar to the LBD conditions, the marginal
value of producing is composed of two terms: the marginal value of earning and the
marginal value of learning by producing. Therefore, as with the LBD model the value
of producing depends not only on the worker’s hourly wage rate ωhj, but also on the
value of learning via producing.
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APPENDIX B
VARIANCE OF EARNINGS, WAGES, AND HOURS WORKED
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Figure B1: Life-cycle variance of log Earnings, Wages, and Hours in the Data
Note: Displays the age effects for the variance of log earnings, wages, and hours in
the data after controlling for year effects.
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APPENDIX C
ROBUSTNESS FOR THE LIFE-CYCLE VARIANCE OF EARNINGS GROWTH
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Figure C1: Life-cycle Variance of 5-year Growth Rates
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings growth
in the data after controlling for year effects. Restrictions on hours, wages, and
earnings are identical to those listen in Section 4, except that the minimum hours
requirement is raised from 500 to 1,800 annual hours. The number of valid ob-
servations is 38,464, down from 42,667 for the data corresponding to Figure 4.
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Figure C2: Variance of 5-year Growth Rates by Age, Education
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings growth
in the data after controlling for year effects. Restrictions on hours, wages, and
earnings are identical to those listen in Section 4. Education is measured as
the number of grades completed (see the variable series which has label 30010
for year 1968). The “No HS” category includes individuals who have completed
0-11 grades; the “HS” category includes individuals who have completed 12-13
grades; the “College” category includes individuals who have completed more than
13 grades. The number of valid observations is 4,269 for the “No HS” cate-
gory, 16,389 for the “HS” category, and 22,009 for the “College” category.
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Figure C3: Variance of 5-year Growth Rates by Experience, Education
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings
growth in the data after controlling for year effects. Restrictions on hours,
wages, earnings, and education are equivalent to those in Figure A3. Expe-
rience is measured as potential experience: age minus grades completed mi-
nus 6. The number of valid observations is 5,954 for the “No HS” cate-
gory, 25,422 for the “HS” category, and 30,518 for the “College” category.
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Figure C4: Life-cycle Variance of 5-year Growth Rates, wj/wj−5 ≥ .9
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings growth
in the data after controlling for year effects. Restrictions on hours, wages,
and earnings are identical to those listen in Section 4, except that the min-
imum growth cutoff is raised from .33 to .9. The number of valid observa-
tions is 33,803, down from 42,667 for the data corresponding to Figure 4.
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Figure C5: Life-cycle Variance of 5-year Smoothed Growth Rates, wj/wj−5 ≥ .9
Note: Displays the age effects for the cross-sectional variance of earnings growth in
the data after controlling for year effects. Hourly wages and earnings are smoothed
with a 3 year centered MA process. Restrictions on hours, smoothed wages, and
smoothed earnings are identical to those listen in Section 4, except that the cutoff
for wage and earnings growth is raised from .33 to .9. The number of valid ob-
servations is 36,103, down from 42,667 for the data corresponding to Figure 4.
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This section details several robustness checks for the variance of wage and earn-
ings growth in Figure 1.3.
First, Figure C1 shows that there is a modest change in the level of the profiles,
but no substantive change in the life-cycle decline of the profiles, when the minimum
hours threshold is increased from 500 hours to 1,800 hours (equivalent to working 35
hours per week for 50 weeks). Therefore, the relatively high variance in growth rates
early in the life-cycle is not due to some young workers earning higher wages as they
make the transition from part time to full time employment, a phenomenon which
does not occur in the human capital model.
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Some of the variance in wage growth could be due to differences in the labor
markets faced by different education groups. Since the model has only one type of
human capital and one labor market, it cannot address heterogeneity in wage growth
which arises because of differences in labor markets. However, Figure C2 reveals that
when I recompute the statistic within different education groups the initial level and
life-cycle decline of the profiles remain broadly consistent with their values in Figure
1.3. 1 Additionally, Figure C3 demonstrates that the same qualitative pattern holds
when I estimate potential experience effects within education groups instead of age
effects.
Another possibility is that the high variance in wage growth for young adults could
be due to more frequent job losses or changes in occupations relative to older adults,
which often entail substantial declines in wages and earnings in the short run. To
remove the component of growth variance which is due to large wage declines, I throw
out all observations in which wages or earnings fell by more than 10%, and plot the
resulting age effects in Figure C4. The initial levels of the profiles are substantially
lower than the initial levels in Figure 1.3, but the size of the declines over the life-cycle
are similar: the variance in hourly wage growth falls by .034 in Figure C4(a) versus
.046 in Figure 1.3(a); the variance in earnings growth falls by .044 in Figure C4(b)
versus .063 in Figure 1.3(b). This establishes that the decline in the variance of wage
and earnings growth is not driven by a reduction in the frequency of large declines in
wages or earnings.
1The profile for individuals without a high school degree is somewhat erratic due to a low sample
size.
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A final concern is that the life-cycle decline in these profiles is due to a decline in
the variance of temporary idiosyncratic shocks to earnings, which are not present in
my (deterministic) model. This suggests it may be important to distinguish between
temporary wage growth and persistent wage growth. To remove purely temporary
changes I smooth the wages and earnings of all individuals with a 3 year Moving
Average process, then recompute the growth rates using these smoothed series. I also
exclude observations in which earnings or wages decline by more than 10%, as was
discussed in the preceding paragraph. The age effects obtained from equation for the
variance in smoothed growth rates are plotted in Figure C5. The initial level of the
profiles are roughly half the initial levels from Figure 1.3, but the life-cycle decline in
the profiles are similar. The profile for hourly wages declines by .033 in Figure C5(a)
compared to .046 in Figure 1.3(a); the profile for annual earnings declines by .045 in
Figure C5(b) versus .063 in Figure 1.3(b).
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